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Market Liquidity in a Natural Experiment: Evidence from CDS Standard Coupons

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(3), 1500-1526
The credit default swap (CDS) Big Bang introduced 2 standard coupons for CDS trading. We exploit the setting of the 2 standard coupons as a natural experiment to quantify the components of the bid–ask spreads in over-the-counter markets. We find that a significant portion of the difference in the bid–ask spread between the 2 coupons is explained by the difference in funding costs. Furthermore, search intensity also explains the variation in the difference in bid–ask spread. The liquidity typically concentrates on one of the standard coupons and can suddenly switch to the other coupon. Using the sudden switch of the primary coupon, we provide further evidence to support the predictions of search-based liquidity models.

The Political Economy of Tariff Exemption Grants

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(6), 2678-2717 open access
We investigate whether firm-level political connections affect the allocation of exemptions from tariffs imposed on $US 550 billion of Chinese goods imported to the United States annually beginning in 2018. Evidence points to politicians not only rewarding supporters but also punishing opponents: Past campaign contributions to the party controlling (in opposition to) the executive branch increase (decrease) approval likelihood. Our findings point to quid pro quo arrangements between politicians and firms, as opposed to the “information” channel linking political access to regulatory outcomes.

The Crowding-In Effect of Public Information on Private Information Acquisition

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(6), 3051-3080 open access
The dissemination of public information regarding an asset’s fundamental value can encourage the acquisition of private information by informed traders, leading to a crowding-in effect. Competing with the crowding-out effect analyzed in prior research, the crowding-in effect shapes the demand for private information in a hump-shaped curve against public information quality. I examine how a for-profit information seller strategically provides information, exploiting this hump-shaped demand curve, and offer theoretical support for the coexistence of free and paid information. The model yields distinctive insights into the equilibrium information structure and market quality when the crowding-in effect drives public information dissemination.

Visible Hands: Professional Asset Managers’ Expectations and the Stock Market in China

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(5), 2469-2499 open access
We study how professional fund managers’ growth expectations affect their equity investments and the consequent effects on prices. Using novel data on China’s mutual fund managers’ growth expectations, we show that pessimistic managers decrease equity allocations and shift away from more cyclical stocks. We identify a statistically significant link between managers’ growth expectations and returns on the stocks that they hold and trade. We also find that an earnings-based measure of price informativeness is increasing in forecasting managers’ investment and forecast-consistent trading, implying that active fund managers in China help move stock prices closer to underlying fundamentals.

Strategic CEO Activism in Polarized Markets

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(2), 617-657 open access
In this article, we show that statements of U.S. CEOs on contentious social issues are not necessarily an expression of their political views. Republican-donor CEOs are three times more likely to make social statements with a liberal slant. CEO activism is more likely if firms’ operating environment is politically polarized and employees are Democrat-leaning. Such statements are associated with a 3% increase in consumer visits to a firm’s Democrat County stores without significantly reducing them in Republican counties. CEO activism is associated with a 0.12% gain in firm value, increased quarterly sales, and a reduced likelihood of shareholder activism on social issues.

Does Speculative News Hurt Productivity? Evidence from Takeover Rumors

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(6), 2952-2996 open access
We show that productivity at both the firm and employee (i.e., analyst and inventor) level temporarily declines upon announcements of takeover rumors that do not materialize. Such speculative news may hurt productivity because uncertainty and the threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced commitment among employees and managers. Consistently, we observe a more pronounced productivity dip for rumored targets and when the likelihood of job loss is higher. Firm performance mirrors these results. We find no indication of reverse causality. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.

Dynamic Adverse Selection and Belief Update in Credit Markets

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(4), 1994-2025 open access
We develop a dynamic model of debt contracts with adverse selection. Entrepreneurs borrow investment goods from lenders to run businesses whose returns depend on entrepreneurial productivity and common productivity. Entrepreneurial productivity is the entrepreneur’s private information, and lenders construct beliefs about entrepreneurial productivity based on the entrepreneur’s business operation history, common productivity history, and the terms of the contract. The model provides insights into the dynamic and cross-sectional relations between firm age and credit risk, persistency of the effects of a productivity shock, cyclical asymmetry of the business cycle, slow recovery after a crisis, and constructive and destructive economic downturns.

Governance by One-Lot Shares

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(2), 874-909 open access
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.

Nepotism in IPOs: Consequences for Issuers and Investors

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(5), 2367-2397 open access
IPO underwriters have an incentive to underprice an IPO when they allocate shares to their affiliated funds. We label this conflict of interest “supernepotism” and we analyze its effect on IPO pricing. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) on a novel hand-collected data set, we find that higher allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds cause higher IPO underpricing. Our evidence suggests that supernepotism has monetary costs for issuers.

Financing Negative Shocks: Evidence from Hurricane Harvey

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2025 60(3), 1342-1372 open access
We examine the effects of a severe climate event on local firms. Our data include 8,218 business credit reports and a detailed survey of 273 businesses in the area affected by Hurricane Harvey. Delinquent credit balances doubled in areas with the worst flooding, although nonflooded areas also had significant credit impairments. Only independent businesses showed signs of distress; subsidiaries of larger firms did not. Firms were largely uninsured and often were denied credit postdisaster. Many funded recovery informally, such as through friends and family. Our findings suggest that several financial frictions compound the challenges posed by a severe climate event.