Knowledge that Transforms

Cartels and bidding rings are often facilitated by intermediaries, who recommend prices/bids to firms and can impose penalties (such as reverting to competitive behavior in future interactions) if these recommendations are not followed. Motivated by such cases, we study correlated equilibria in first-price procurement auctions with complete information, where bidders who disobey their recommendations are penalized. Cartel-optimal profit is greater when more information about submitted bids is disclosed at auction and when the maximum penalty is larger. When only the winner’s identity is disclosed (or the winner’s identity and bid), cartels do not benefit from mediation. Our main result characterizes the cartel-optimal equilibrium with two symmetric bidders when both bids are disclosed. The optimal equilibrium involves extensive randomization and displays tied bids and high winning bids with positive probability, even when the maximum penalty is very small. The stationary mediation schemes we consider are always more profitable for the cartel than bid rotation.

We develop a new method to construct instruments in a broad class of economic environments. In the economies we study, a few large firms, industries, or countries account for an important share of economic activity. Idiosyncratic shocks to these large players significantly affect aggregate outcomes and are valid instruments. We provide a methodology to extract these idiosyncratic shocks to create granular instrumental variables (GIVs), which are size-weighted sums of idiosyncratic shocks. We show how GIVs enable us to estimate causal parameters, such as elasticities and multipliers, and are applicable in a broad range of empirically relevant settings.

We estimate a life-cycle model of consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply. The interaction between human capital and labor supply toward the end of the life cycle is most novel. The estimates replicate the main features of the data, in particular the large increase in wages and small increase in labor supply at the beginning of the life cycle and the small decrease in wages but large decrease in labor supply toward the end. We show that incorporating human capital is critical when analyzing changes to Social Security.

We evaluate progress in the War on Poverty as President Lyndon B. Johnson defined it, which established a 20% baseline poverty rate and adopted an absolute standard. While the official poverty rate fell from 19.5% in 1963 to 10.5% in 2019, our absolute full-income poverty measure—which uses a fuller income measure and updates thresholds only for inflation—fell from 19.5% to 1.6%. However, we also show that relative poverty reductions have been modest. Additionally, government dependence increased over this time, with the share of working-age adults receiving under half their income from market sources more than doubling.

Concerns about income inequality emphasize the importance of accurate income measures. Estimates of top income shares based only on individual tax returns are biased by tax-base changes, social changes, and missing income sources. This paper addresses these shortcomings and presents new estimates of the distribution of national income since 1960. Our analysis of pretax income shows that top income shares are lower and have increased less since 1980 than other studies using tax data. In addition, increasing government transfers and tax progressivity have resulted in rising real incomes for all income groups and little change in aftertax top income shares.

We study a mentoring program that aims to improve the labor market prospects of disadvantaged adolescents. Our randomized controlled trial investigates its effectiveness on three outcomes highly predictive of later labor market success: math grades, patience/social skills, and labor market orientation. For low-SES (socioeconomic status) adolescents, the mentoring increases a combined index of the outcomes by over half a standard deviation after 1 year, with significant increases in each outcome. Effects on grades and labor market orientation, but not on patience/social skills, persist 3 years after program start. By that time, the mentoring also improves early realizations of school-to-work transitions for low-SES adolescents. The mentoring is not effective for higher-SES adolescents.

Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficient market design in equilibrium of a market-design adoption game. We discuss implications for policy and insights for the literatures on market design, innovation, and platforms.

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.