Knowledge that Transforms

We show how a discrete instrument can be used to identify the marginal treatment effects under a functional structure that allows for treatment heterogeneity among individuals with the same observed characteristics and self-selection based on the unobserved gain from treatment. Guided by this identification result, we perform a marginal treatment effect analysis of the interaction between the quantity and quality of children. Our estimates reveal that the family size effects vary in magnitude and even sign and that families act as if they possess some knowledge of the idiosyncratic effects in the fertility decision.

This study examines how a policy that sharply increased alcohol availability during 8.5 months affected the labor productivity of those exposed to it in utero. Compared to the surrounding cohorts, the prenatally exposed children have substantially worse labor market and educational outcomes and lower cognitive and noncognitive ability. Effects on earnings are found throughout the distribution but are largest below the median. Males are more affected than females, consistent with growing evidence that boys are less resilient to early environmental insults. The long-term effects seem primarily driven by changes in prenatal health rather than changes in the childhood environment.

We prove a new identification theorem showing nonparametric identification of the joint distribution of random coefficients in general nonlinear and additive models. This differs from existing random coefficients models by not imposing a linear index structure for the regressors. We then model unobserved preference heterogeneity in consumer demand as utility functions with random Barten scales. These Barten scales appear as random coefficients in nonlinear demand equations. Using Canadian data, we compare estimated energy demand functions with and without random Barten scales. We find that unobserved preference heterogeneity substantially affects the estimated consumer surplus costs of an energy tax.

If people enjoy giving, then why do they avoid fund-raisers? Partnering with the Salvation Army at Christmastime, we conducted a randomized field experiment placing bell ringers at one or both main entrances to a supermarket, making it easy or difficult to avoid the ask. Additionally, bell ringers either were silent or said “please give.” Making avoidance difficult increased both the rate of giving and donations. Paradoxically, the verbal ask dramatically increased giving but also led to dramatic avoidance. We argue that this illustrates sophisticated awareness of the empathy-altruism link: people avoid empathic stimulation to regulate their giving and guilt.

Views on the role played by banks in the economy have evolved greatly over the last 125 years, as have arguments on the need, as well as the best way, to regulate them. Some of the key insights in the debate have been published in the Journal of Political Economy. In what follows, we will outline the main contributions to the debate in recent years, with an emphasis on work done at the University of Chicago or published in the JPE. We want to emphasize work that has relevance today, but despite this caveat, we will probably end up doing injustice to work published long ago. We begin with a framework for organizing the theories of intermediation. We then draw out the implications for what the theories say about regulation and note that in many respects the motivation for regulation has been only loosely tied to the theory of intermediation. We close with some open questions for regulators and economists interested in banking. We do not survey the research that has followed up on work published in the JPE, nor will we attempt to provide a detailed overview of the entire academic literature on banking. For that, we refer the reader to the excellent work by Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008).

We estimate a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply, fertility, and savings, incorporating occupational choices, with specific wage paths and skill atrophy that vary over the career. This allows us to understand the trade-off between occupational choice and desired fertility, as well as sorting both into the labor market and across occupations. We quantify the life cycle career costs associated with children, how they decompose into loss of skills during interruptions, lost earnings opportunities, and selection into more child-friendly occupations. We analyze the long-run effects of policies that encourage fertility and show that they are considerably smaller than short-run effects.