We show that oil production from existing wells in Texas does not respond to oil prices, while drilling activity and costs respond strongly. To explain these facts, we reformulate Hotelling’s classic model of exhaustible resource extraction as a drilling problem: firms choose when to drill, but production from existing wells is constrained by reservoir pressure, which decays as oil is extracted. The model implies a modified Hotelling rule for drilling revenues net of costs, explains why the production constraint typically binds, and rationalizes regional production peaks and observed patterns of prices, drilling, and production following demand and supply shocks.

We attempt to understand potential common forces behind rising market concentration and a slowdown in business dynamism in the US economy, through a micro-founded general equilibrium model of endogenous firm dynamics. The model captures the strategic behavior between competing firms, its effect on their innovation decisions, and the resulting “best-versus-the-rest” dynamics. We consider multiple potential mechanisms that can drive the observed changes and use the calibrated model to assess their relative importance, with particular attention to the implied transitional dynamics. Our results highlight the dominant role of a decline in the intensity of knowledge diffusion from frontier firms to laggard ones. We present new evidence that corroborates a declining knowledge diffusion in the economy.

A model in which the individual with median anticipated health expenditures an choose the level of deductible supplementation for his group is used to estimate the demand for supplementary insurance. Differences between individually purchased and group insurance are discussed. Claims and expenditure data are used to show that demand for supplementation of outpatient services will be small unless the tax subsidy of insurance is continued. Experience from Medicare corroborates these predictions.

For governments procuring innovation, one choice is whether to specify desired products (a "Conventional" approach) or allow firms to suggest ideas (an "Open" approach). Using a U.S. Air Force R&D grant program, where Open and Conventional competitions were held simultaneously, we find that Open awards increase both commercial innovation and technology adoption by the military. In contrast, Conventional awards have no positive technology effects, but do create more program lock-in. The Open program attracts new types of applicants (e.g. start-ups), but openness also has a differential impact beyond inducing selection. These results suggest benefits from open approaches to innovation procurement.

In many industries, upstream manufacturers pay downstream retailers for achieving quantity or market share targets. These “vertical rebates” may mitigate downstream moral hazard by inducing greater retail effort but may also incentivize retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting effects empirically for a rebate paid to one retailer. Using a field experiment, we exogenously vary the outcome of retailer effort. We estimate models of consumer choice and retailer behavior to quantify the rebate’s effect on retail assortment and effort. We find that the rebate is designed to exclude a competing product and fails to maximize social surplus.

The household production literature emphasizes that technical or biological processes condition input selection by households in their production activities, along with prices and income. Exogenous variations in health, to the extent that they are perceived by individuals (heterogeneity), lead to correlations between inputs and health outcomes that cannot be used to derive causal conclusions. Therefore, estimates of health technology must be obtained from a behavioral model in which health inputs are themselves choices. Consistent estimates are reported of the effect of endogenous inputs, such as medical care, smoking, and fertility, on birth weight and fetal growth in the presence of health heterogeneity.

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.

Using factor methods, we decompose industrial production (IP) into components arising from aggregate and sector-specific shocks. An approximate factor model finds that nearly all of IP variability is associated with common factors. We then use a multisector growth model to adjust for the effects of input-output linkages in the factor analysis. Thus, a structural factor analysis indicates that the Great Moderation was characterized by a fall in the importance of aggregate shocks while the volatility of sectoral shocks was essentially unchanged. Consequently, the role of idiosyncratic shocks increased considerably after the mid-1980s, explaining half of the quarterly variation in IP.

We describe how capital accumulation and the network structure of US production interact to amplify the effects of sectoral trend growth rates in total factor productivity and labor on trend GDP (gross domestic product) growth. We derive expressions that conveniently summarize this long-run amplification effect by way of sectoral multipliers. We estimate that sector-specific factors have historically accounted for approximately three-fourths of long-run changes in GDP growth. Trend GDP growth fell by nearly 3 percentage points over the postwar period, with especially significant contributions from the Construction sector in 1950–80 and the Durable Goods sector in 2000–2018. No sector has contributed any steady significant increase to the trend growth rate of GDP in the past 70 years.