Much experimental evidence indicates that choice depends on the status quo or reference level: changes of reference point often lead to reversals of preference. We present a reference-dependent theory of consumer choice, which explains such effects by a deformation of indifference curves about the reference point. The central assumption of the theory is that losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages. Implications of loss aversion for economic behavior are considered.

We establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws. Individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age, and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year. Roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws. We estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education. The instrumental variables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate, suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates.

This paper argues that firms use debt to protect the wealth of shareholders from the threat of unionization. Under U. S. labor law the firm cannot prohibit its workers from attempting to form a collective bargaining unit. Debt policy offers a method of reducing the impact of this monopoly right on shareholders. By issuing debt, the firm credibly reduces the funds that are available to a potential union. Empirical evidence that strongly supports this hypothesis is presented.

This paper develops a search-theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials. Given coordination problems in the labor market, the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered; in equilibrium, firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages. The model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry-average capital-labor ratio and profitability. Additionally, the model predicts that high-wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements.

This paper uses simple summary statistics to analyze the volatility, persistence, and comovement of 38 annual individual production series for the period 1889–1984. It seeks to identify the size, source, and correlation of fluctuations in the production of specific commodities within various sample periods and to analyze possible changes in these characteristics over time. The paper also discusses the implications of the behavior of individual production series for the behavior of the aggregate economy within the prewar, interwar, and postwar eras.

This paper analyzes debt maturity structure for borrowers with private information about their future credit rating. Borrowers' projects provide them with rents that they cannot assign to lenders. The optimal maturity structure trades off a preference for short maturity due to expecting their credit rating to improve, against liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the risk that a borrower will lose the nonassignable rents due to excessive liquidation incentives of lenders. Borrowers with high credit ratings prefer short-term debt, and those with somewhat lower ratings prefer long-term debt. Still lower rated borrowers can issue only short-term debt.

This paper explores the recent decline in the fraction of unemployed workers who receive unemployment insurance benefits. Using March Current Population Surveys, we compare the fraction who are potentially eligible for benefits with the fraction who receive them. The decline in insured unemployment is almost entirely due to a decline in the early 1980s in the takeup rate for benefits. We analyze the determinants of the takeup rate, using both aggregated state-level data and micro-data. At least half the decline is due to an increasing share of unemployment in states with lower takeup rates.

This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital. Investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set. The analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process.