Knowledge that Transforms

Public interventions in the apprenticeship market often aim to increase demand or returns. We set up a double-sided experiment with youth and firms to analyse a subsidized dual apprenticeship program. This intervention seeks to relax financial constraints for youth by offering a wage subsidy and to make apprenticeship more attractive by providing vocational training in technical skills that complements on-the-job training. We document a large increase in youth participation in apprenticeship, yet the inflow of apprentices induces little crowding out of traditional apprentices in firms. The intervention leads to an increase in youth demand for apprenticeship, enabling firms to fill open apprenticeship positions. The subsidy compensates apprentices for low wages but does not alleviate financial constraints. Consistent with the dual training component contributing to an increase in youth demand for apprenticeship, youth perform more complex tasks and have higher earnings 4 years after the start of the experiment.

Authorities’ support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking activity on their soil. Firms’ locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial assistance in distress and therefore on factors such as countries’ relative resilience. We predict that global firms are global in life and national in death; and that they become less global when competition is more intense, times are turbulent, and international risk sharing (say, through swap lines) weak. We analyse the competitive benefits of industrial and banking policies as well as their limitations, such as currency appreciation.

How do innovation and education policy affect individual career choices and aggregate productivity? This paper analyses the effect of R&D subsidies and higher education policy on productivity growth through the supply of innovative talent. We put scarce talent, higher education attainment, and career choice at the centre of a new endogenous growth framework with individual-level heterogeneity in talent, financial resources, and preferences. We link the model to micro-level data from Denmark on the backgrounds of who obtains a PhD and becomes an inventor and the outcomes of a set of policy interventions. We find that R&D subsidies can be strengthened when combined with higher education subsidies, which enable talented but poor youth to pursue a career in research. Education and innovation policies not only alleviate different frictions, but also impact innovation at different time horizons. Education policy is more effective in societies with higher income inequality.

What sows the seeds of financial crises, and what policies can help avoid them? I model the interaction between the ex-ante production of assets and ex-post adverse selection in financial markets. Positive shocks that increase market prices exacerbate the production of low-quality assets and can increase the likelihood of a financial market collapse. The interest rate and the liquidity premium are endogenous and depend on the functioning of financial markets as well as the total supply of assets (private and public). Optimal policy balances the economy’s liquidity needs ex-post with the production incentives ex-ante, and it can be implemented with three instruments: government bonds, asset purchase programs, and transaction taxes. Public liquidity improves incentives but implies a higher deadweight loss than private market interventions. Optimal policy does not rule out private market collapses but mitigates the fluctuations in total liquidity.

We study the long-term effects of a randomized intervention targeting children's socio-emotional skills. The classroom-based intervention for primary school children has positive impacts that persist for over a decade. Treated children become more likely to complete academic high school and enrol in university. Two mechanisms drive these results. Treated children show fewer attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms: they are less impulsive and less disruptive. They also attain higher grades, but they do not score higher on standardized tests. The long-term effects on educational attainment thus appear to be driven by changes in socio-emotional skills rather than cognitive skills.

How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organisations.

Historically, large changes in U.S. government spending induced fiscal efforts that were not all alike, with some using more progressive taxes than others. We develop a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model to analyse how the distribution of taxes across households shapes spending multipliers. The model yields empirically realistic distributions in marginal propensities to consume and labour elasticities, which result in lower responsiveness to tax changes for higher-income earners. In turn, multipliers are larger when spending is financed with higher tax progressivity—that is, when the tax burden falls more heavily on higher-income earners. This result is historically material. We estimate that, on average, tax rates increased more for top-income than for bottom-income earners after a spending shock. Thus, the typical U.S. spending shock was financed with higher tax progressivity. We further exploit the historical variation in the financing of spending to estimate progressivity-dependent multipliers, which we find consistent with the model.

As utility services expand throughout the developing world, providers must grapple with how to set prices to recover average costs. Data from a multiyear randomised pricing experiment among nearly 1,500 recently connected piped water customers in Vietnam reveal month-to-month demand persistence. Based on structural demand estimation, we document how endogenous preferences, if unaccounted for, can lead to low take-up and thereby threaten the financial viability of the new water utility. We also show that such demand persistence calls for pricing schemes that defer lump-sum payment, effectively allowing future consumers to subsidise their present selves.

This paper develops a theory of subjective beliefs that departs from rational expectations, and shows that biases in household beliefs have quantitatively large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. The departures are formalized using model-consistent notions of pessimism and optimism which are supported by extensive time-series and cross-sectional evidence from household surveys. The role subjective beliefs play in aggregate fluctuations is quantified in a business cycle model with goods and labour market frictions. Consistent with the survey evidence, an increase in pessimism generates upward biases in unemployment and inflation forecasts and lowers economic activity. The underlying belief distortions reduce aggregate demand and propagate through frictional goods and labour markets. As a by-product of the analysis, solution techniques that preserve the effects of time-varying belief distortions in the class of linear solutions are developed.

After a drug obtains marketing authorisation, the usage depends on the regulation of off-label prescriptions for unapproved indications. We investigate the impact of off-label prescription regulation on physicians’ behaviour, patients’ health, treatment costs, and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing with a structural demand and supply model. Exploiting rich panel data on physicians’ activities and office visits in France over 9 years, we use a model of prescription choice and health outcomes with unobserved patient-level heterogeneity. We identify the demand for on-label and off-label drugs and the effect of prescription choice on health outcomes. On the supply side, we use a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model between the government and the pharmaceutical companies that allows the partial identification of the marginal costs of drugs. Counterfactual simulations show that when we remove off-label drugs from the choice set of physicians, substitution to on-label drugs at constant prices would lead to an increase of 15% in the expenditure on prescription drugs. If we allow bargaining adjustment on drug prices under a ban on off-label prescriptions, the ban would further increase the treatment cost, by 26%, without improving health outcomes.