Knowledge that Transforms

In Los Angeles, all-cash home purchases quintupled during the last decade. Compared with an else-equal mortgage offer, a cash offer is associated with 29 percent shorter time-to-close and a 2–3.9 percent price discount, indicating a substantial amount of financing risk—the risk to a seller that a transaction may not close on time and may fail to occur again because a mortgage contingency fails. The estimated cash discount aligns well with a canonical model calibrated to the sample market. Our findings reveal that closing risk alone is insufficient to explain the cash discount. Rather, it turns on the possibility that a property back on the market may fail to sell, requiring a substantial risk compensation. The estimated cash discount is smaller during booms and in larger markets, highlighting the inseparability of financial frictions in the mortgage market and search frictions in the housing market.

We uncover a link between momentum and overvaluation: assets that generate strong momentum profits have lower risk-adjusted unconditional returns; conversely, trading momentum within overvalued assets doubles the profit of the standard momentum strategy. We compute the profits of a momentum strategy within various portfolios; portfolios within which momentum is profitable are defined as momentum trading opportunity (MTO). High-MTO assets have negative unconditional alphas and concentrate in the short legs of most anomalies; controlling for MTO reduces anomaly alphas by up to half. These results imply that the existence of other anomalies is closely linked to the existence of momentum and they should be studied jointly.

This article investigates how cross-selling affects relationship lending using internal data from a large bank and the Swedish credit registry. I show that within a bank–firm relationship, profit earned from non-loan products cross-subsidizes loans and increases (1) credit supply and (2) the likelihood of the bank’s pausing or waiving interest payments for delinquent loans (lenience in delinquency). For identification, I exploit the Basel II-induced exogenous variation in products’ profitability while holding constant the firm’s creditworthiness and relationship informativeness. I find that the average affected firm experienced a decrease of 6 percent ($400,000) in credit supply and 30 percent (9.8 pp) in lenience in delinquency. The results highlight the importance of cross-subsidization as a mechanism through which cross-selling affects bank–firm relationships and inform optimal regulatory design for lenders who multi-produce.

How does common ownership affect creative destruction? What are the underlying mechanisms? Do the effects of increased common ownership vary among different customer segments? Using product-level data, we show that, on average, firms with greater common ownership introduce new products at a faster rate and discontinue existing products at a similar pace. The observed economic impacts intensify over time, reflecting the gradual nature of knowledge spillovers and the learning curve. Subsequent to an increase in common ownership, portfolio firms tend to both add and drop products that are dissimilar to those of their rival firms, with the net effect of decreasing between-firm product dissimilarity. We also find that the effects are more relevant for product modules with greater technological likeness, lower barriers to market entry, and greater numbers of product market players. Product variety is substantially greater in product lines catering to higher-income households. Overall, the result highlights the procompetitive effects of increased common ownership.

Existing research finds that investors’ returns vary with their wealth and level of sophistication. We bring a new perspective from the supply side by showing that return heterogeneity can be magnified as assets offered by the market become more complex. Using detailed account-level data, we examine the trading of B funds—complex, structured products in the Chinese market. During a 3-year market cycle, the return gap between the naive and sophisticated is an order-of-magnitude greater when trading B funds than when trading simple, non-structured funds. In an event study, we confirm that this disparity is driven by differences in investors’ understanding of product complexity.

Using new data from US and global markets, we revisit market risk premium predictability by equity anomalies. We apply a repertoire of machine-learning methods to forty-two countries to reach a simple conclusion: anomalies, as such, cannot predict aggregate market returns. Any ostensible evidence from the USA lacks external validity in two ways: it cannot be extended internationally and does not hold for alternative anomaly sets—regardless of the selection and design of factor strategies. The predictability—if any—originates from a handful of specific anomalies and depends heavily on seemingly minor methodological choices. Overall, our results challenge the view that anomalies as a group contain helpful information for forecasting market risk premia.

I show that the corporate group structure generates tax benefits that create incentives for higher leverage. The tax benefits arise when losses on distressed subsidiaries are tax deductible for a parent firm. Higher tax rates then imply that more of these losses are borne by the government instead of the parent firm, reducing the expected costs of bankruptcy and thereby incentivizing the subsidiaries to take on higher leverage. Using data from a large sample of European multinationals, I show that this tax benefit exists on top of the trade-off theory and debt-shifting effects, and is stronger when deductions of subsidiary losses are more generous.

Covariances between aggregate stock returns and changes in bond yields change sign over time. Existing theories emphasize either time-varying properties of expected inflation or time-varying properties of real yields. Using revisions in survey forecasts as proxies for macroeconomic news, neither approach succeeds empirically. Inflation-centric models require much more news about expected future inflation than we observe from surveys. Real-centric models posit signs of covariances among macroeconomic news, changes in yields, and stock returns that do not match those in the data. In a nutshell, macroeconomic news appears to drive a substantial part of stock–bond comovement, but not in ways consistent with our theories.

We compare the growth and responsiveness to demand shocks of post-initial public offering (IPO) firms and their private counterparts. Using multiple measures of myopia and multiple ways to match IPO firms with private firms, we do not find evidence of myopic behavior by public firms. IPO firms respond more to investment opportunities and have higher productivity in their early public years. Our results on public firms’ sensitivity to growth opportunities hold under several robustness tests, including when we consider firms’ total growth including acquisitions. The results show the importance of matching public to private firms early in their life.

This article examines the impact of mainland Chinese buyers in the Hong Kong housing market, using complete transaction records between 2001 and 2017. We find that mainland buyers pay an average price premium of 1.4% compared with locals. The premiums are estimated to be 3.5% for large-sized luxury units and 1.6% for homes in central locations. The mechanisms that underlie the price premiums include a hedging effect, residential sorting, and information barriers, of which the hedging motive has the strongest impact. Mainland buyers’ price premiums rise significantly when the Chinese currency depreciates or China Economic Policy Uncertainty increases. Our study sheds light on the impact and mechanism of the ““China shock” on the global housing markets.