Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Abstract We show how to reverse-engineer banks’ risk disclosures, such as value-at-risk, to obtain an implied measure of their exposures to equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity risks. Factor implied risk exposures are obtained by breaking down a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility component and a bank-specific risk exposure component. In a study of large US and international banks, we show that (i) changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated with market volatility and (ii) changes in risk exposures are positively correlated across banks, which is consistent with banks exhibiting commonality in trading.

Abstract This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.

Abstract We investigate the relationship between market power and risk for a large panel of banks worldwide. Loan and deposit market power are measured separately at bank-year level, and the risk effect of market power is conditioned on several factors predicted by theory. Both loan and deposit market power have a stable, monotonically negative effect on risk, irrespective of risk measure. The effect is larger for asset risk, and is independent of charter value and capital ratios. The effect on default risk tends to decrease in the quality of banking regulation, whereas the conditioning effects of deposit insurance protection are mixed.

Abstract The inverse relation between leverage and profitability is widely regarded as a serious defect of the trade-off theory. We show that the defect is not with the theory but with the use of a leverage ratio in which profitability affects both the numerator and the denominator. Profitability directly increases the value of equity. Firms do take the predicted offsetting actions. They issue debt and repurchase equity when profitability rises, and retire debt and issue equity when profitability falls. Consistent with variable transactions costs, the adjustment is not generally sufficient to fully undo the profitability shocks. Accordingly, on average the leverage ratio falls as profitability rises.

Abstract This article examines enterprises funded by government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs). We find that enterprises funded by both GVCs and private venture capitalists (PVCs) obtain more investment than enterprises funded purely by PVCs, and much more than those funded purely by GVCs. Also, markets with more GVC funding have more VC funding per enterprise and more VC-funded enterprises, suggesting that GVC finance largely augments rather than displaces PVC finance. There is also a positive association between mixed GVC/PVC funding and successful exits, as measured by initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions, attributable largely to the additional investment.

Abstract This article studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive demonstrates that (i) excess risk taking can be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the credit default swaps (CDS) spread, (ii) shareholders may not be able to commit to design such contracts, and (iii) they may not want to due to distortions from deposit insurance or unobservable tail risk. The advantage of using the CDS spread rather than deferred compensation or debt is due to the fact that it is a market price and reduces agency costs.

Abstract In emerging economies, institutional and regulatory constraints can distort loan contracting and, hence, the incentives of lenders and borrowers. Studying the South Korean syndicated loan market, we find that during the 90s the safety net protecting business groups (chaebols)—especially the government’s bailout policy—affected the structure and pricing of loans to chaebol firms. However, after the chaebol reform of the late 90s dismantled the chaebol safety net, the differences in loan contracts between chaebol and non-chaebol firms narrowed or disappeared. The results suggest that the reform restored lenders’ incentives to monitor chaebol firms and properly assess their risk.

Abstract We analyze the strengths and weaknesses of stakeholder and shareholder firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more concerned with avoiding bankruptcy to protect their employees and suppliers. In equilibrium, they are more valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty exceeds demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. Finally, we analyze firm financial constraints and derive implications for the capital structure of stakeholder firms.

Abstract This article examines how credit rating agencies (CRAs) react to rating decisions on mortgage-backed securities by rival agencies in the aftermath of the subprime crisis. While Fitch is on average the first mover, Moody’s and S&P perform more timely downgrades given a downgrade or a more severe evaluation by a CRA other than Fitch, and they also influence Fitch more than they are influenced by it. Rating convergence is more likely when Fitch rather than the rival has to adjust its evaluation downwards. Our results support theoretical predictions on the role of reputation in explaining herding behavior among CRAs.