Knowledge that Transforms

Cryptocurrencies have received growing attention from individuals, the media, and regulators. However, little is known about the investors whom these financial instruments attract. Using administrative data, we describe the investment behavior of individuals who invest in cryptocurrencies with structured retail products. We find that cryptocurrency investors are active traders who are prone to investment biases and hold risky portfolios. Cryptocurrency investors are more likely to invest in stocks with high media sentiment and more likely to employ heuristics from technical analysis. In line with attention effects and anticipatory utility, we find that the average cryptocurrency investor substantially increases account logins and trading activity after his or her first cryptocurrency purchase. Furthermore, cryptocurrency investors tend to tilt their portfolios toward even more risky securities after cryptocurrency adoption. Our results document which investors are more likely to adopt new financial products and help inform regulators about investors’ vulnerability to cryptocurrency investments.

Using a representative sample of credit card holders from a leading Chinese commercial bank, we investigate how consumers respond to an unexpected interest rate decrease that automatically reduces interest expenses for all mortgage borrowers in the country and thereby generates significant positive disposable-income shocks. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that compared with homeowners without mortgage obligations, mortgage borrowers increased their monthly credit card spending by 8.7% after the 230-bps mortgage rate reduction announced in September 2008. We find a significant spending response both immediately after the announcement and during the post-reset period. The credit card delinquency rate also decreased after the mortgage rate reset. Subsequent to an interest-rate increase episode, mortgage borrowers symmetrically reduced their credit card spending. Hand-to-mouth mortgage borrowers experienced a more pronounced spending increase. The debt-service channel plays an important role in transmitting monetary policy—our estimate implies a marginal propensity to consume 0.40–0.54 through credit card spending.

By analyzing a hand-collected transaction-level dataset on the finance leases of China’s public firms for the period 2007–19, this article sheds light on China’s leasing market, the second largest in the world. We find that banks use their affiliated leasing firms to provide credit to clients in order to circumvent the government’s targeted credit tightening policy. In contrast to conventional view of regulatory arbitrage, our evidence shows that, rather than hiding risk and gambling for profit, banks-affiliated leasing firms have prudent risk control and efficient pricing. These bank-affiliated institutions are used by banks to play strategic role in relationship banking. Moreover, the ownership of the lessor also matters for the financing choice of the lessee.

This paper investigates the divergence of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings based on data from six prominent ESG rating agencies: Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD), Sustainalytics, Moody’s ESG (Vigeo-Eiris), S&P Global (RobecoSAM), Refinitiv (Asset4), and MSCI. We document the rating divergence and map the different methodologies onto a common taxonomy of categories. Using this taxonomy, we decompose the divergence into contributions of scope, measurement, and weight. Measurement contributes 56% of the divergence, scope 38%, and weight 6%. Further analyzing the reasons for measurement divergence, we detect a rater effect where a rater’s overall view of a firm influences the measurement of specific categories. The results call for greater attention to how the data underlying ESG ratings are generated.

We show that credit rating agencies can influence political elections. We find that incumbent political parties experience an increase in their vote shares following municipal bond upgrades. The evidence is consistent with rating agencies affecting elections indirectly by expanding local governments’ debt capacity and directly through an impact on voters’ perceptions of the quality of incumbent politicians. To identify these effects, we examine election outcomes within neighboring counties by exploiting exogenous variation in municipal bond ratings due to Moody’s recalibration of its scale in 2010.

Using a portfolio theory framework, we introduce the concept of “political beta” to model firm-level export diversification in response to global political risk. Our model predicts that firms are less responsive to changes in political relations with lower beta countries—those that contribute less to the firm’s total political risk. We document patterns consistent with our model using disaggregated Russian firm-by-destination-country data during 2001–2011: Trade is positively correlated with political relations, though the effect is far weaker for trading partners whose political relations with Russia are relatively uncorrelated with those of other partners in a firm’s export portfolio.

We offer a theory of financial contagion based on the information choice of investors after observing a financial crisis elsewhere. We study global coordination games of regime change in two regions linked by an initially unobserved macro shock. A crisis in region 1 is a wake-up call to investors in region 2. It induces them to reassess the regional fundamental and acquire information about the macro shock. Contagion can occur even after investors learn that region 2 has no ex post exposure to region 1. We explore normative and testable implications of the model. In particular, our results rationalize evidence about contagious currency crises and bank runs after wake-up calls and provide some guidance for future empirical work.

Relative performance (RPE) awards have become an important component of executive compensation. We examine whether RPE awards, particularly the peer group, are structured in a manner consistent with economic theory. For RPE awards using a custom peer group, we find that the custom group is significantly more effective than four plausible alternative peer groups at filtering out common shocks, lowering the cost of compensation, and increasing managerial incentives. For RPE awards using a market index, we find some evidence that firms could have selected a custom set of peers with better filtering properties at a lower cost with similar incentives. For example, firms could have saved around $118,000 in present value terms, on average, for an RPE award had they chosen a custom group comprising of their product market peers instead of a market index.

An arbitrageur with short investment horizon gains from accelerating price discovery by advertising his private information. However, advertising many assets may overload investors’ attention, reducing the number of informed traders per asset, and slowing price discovery. So the arbitrageur optimally concentrates advertising on just a few assets, unless his trades have significant price impact. The arbitrageur’s gain from advertising is increasing in the assets’ mispricing and in the precision of his private information, and is decreasing in its complexity. If several arbitrageurs have private information, inefficient equilibria can arise, where substantial mispricing persists or investors’ attention is overloaded.

We study whether institutional investors that sign the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), a commitment to responsible investing, exhibit better portfolio-level environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores. Signatories outside of the USA have superior ESG scores than nonsignatories, but US signatories have at best similar ESG ratings, and worse scores if they have underperformed recently, are retail-client facing, and joined the PRI late. US signatories do not improve the ESG scores of portfolio companies after investing in them. Commercial motives, uncertainty about fiduciary duties, and lower ESG market maturity explain why US-domiciled PRI signatories do not follow through on their responsible investment commitments.