While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier

We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems

We show that the propensity of a bank to experience extreme co-movements in its credit default swap (CDS) premia together with the market is priced in the bank’s default swap spread during the financial crisis. We measure a bank’s CDS tail beta by estimating the upper tail dependence between its default swap spreads and a CDS market index. Our study shows that protection sellers receive a premium for bearing the risk of extreme upward co-movements in default risk. The economic significance of this effect is large yet limited to the recent financial crisis. Banks in the upper quintile of CDS tail beta have spreads that are on average 140 basis points higher than those of banks in the lower CDS tail beta quintile

In over-the-counter markets, dealers facilitate trade by providing liquidity and acting as intermediaries. We use proprietary data on US single-name credit default swap trades and positions to study how dealer intermediation networks shape liquidity. For each reference entity, we reconstruct interdealer and dealer-to-client networks and introduce Shapley value-based measures of dealer and market connectivity. We present a cooperative game framework that links these measures to predictions for the liquidity that dealers provide at both individual and market levels. Empirically, we find that Shapley values are strongly associated with trade volumes, inventory management, execution costs, and bid–ask spreads

We find that a firm’s stock price reaction to its credit rating downgrade announcement is muted by 44–52% when credit default swaps (CDSs) trade on its debt. We explore the role of the CDS markets in providing information ex ante and relieving financing frictions ex post for downgraded firms. We find that the impact of CDS trading is more pronounced for firms whose debt financing is more dependent on credit ratings (e.g., those rated around the speculative-grade boundary, those with a higher number of rating-based covenants). Reductions in debt and investment, and the increase in financing costs are less severe for CDS firms than non-CDS firms following an identical credit rating downgrade. Our results suggest that CDSs mute the stock market reaction to a credit rating downgrade by alleviating the financing frictions faced by downgraded firms

This paper examines the interaction between default risk and interest-rate risk in determining the term structure of credit default swap spreads at different industry sectors and credit-rating classes. The paper starts with a parsimonious three-factor interest-rate dynamic term structure and projects the credit spread at each industry sector and rating class to these interest-rate factors while also allowing the projection residual dynamics to depend on the level of the interest-rate factors. Estimation shows that credit risk exhibits intricate dynamic interactions with the interest-rate factors

Prices observed in the European sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market have severely increased since the beginning of the financial crisis. We document that the state of a country’s financial system and, since the beginning of the crisis, also the state of the world financial system have strong explanatory power for the behavior of CDS spreads, and the magnitude of this impact depends on the importance of a country’s financial system pre-crisis. Furthermore, Economic and Monetary Union member countries exhibit higher sensitivities to the health of the financial system. Our results suggest the presence of a private-to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts

We characterize dependence in corporate credit and equity returns for 215 firms using a new class of large-scale dynamic copula models. Copula dependence and especially tail dependence are highly variable and persistent, increase significantly in the financial crisis, and have remained high since. The most drastic increases in credit dependence occur in July/August of 2007 and in August of 2011 and the decrease in diversification potential caused by the increases in dependence and tail dependence is large. Credit default swap correlation dynamics are important determinants of credit spreads

This article studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive demonstrates that (i) excess risk taking can be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the credit default swaps (CDS) spread, (ii) shareholders may not be able to commit to design such contracts, and (iii) they may not want to due to distortions from deposit insurance or unobservable tail risk. The advantage of using the CDS spread rather than deferred compensation or debt is due to the fact that it is a market price and reduces agency costs

We analyze the reactions of stock returns and the spreads of credit default swaps (CDS) of banks from Europe and the USA to four major regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, employing an event study analysis. Contrary to public perception, we find that financial markets indeed reacted to the structural reforms enacted at the national level. The reforms succeeded in reducing bail-out expectations relative to the post-bail-out period, especially for systemic banks. The strongest effects were found for the Dodd–Frank Act and in particular for the Volcker rule. Bank profitability was affected in all countries, showing up in lower equity returns