We test the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of irrationality-induced financial anomalies by sorting securities on their individual residual variability as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk – a commonly asserted limit to arbitrage – and comparing the strength of anomalous returns in low versus high residual variability portfolios. We find no support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain undervaluation anomalies (small value stocks, value stocks generally, recent winners, and positive earnings surprises) but strong support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain overvaluation anomalies (small growth stocks, growth stocks generally, recent losers, and negative earnings surprises). Other tests also fail to support the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of overvaluation anomalies and suggest that at least some of the factor premiums for size, book-to-market, and momentum are unrelated to irrationality protected by limits to arbitrage

We examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for the positive cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns. Consistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis, we find that the cash holding effect is significant when sentiment is low, and it is insignificant when sentiment is high. In addition, the cash holding effect is strong among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility, indicating that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is costly and risky. In line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis, high costs and risk prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect

We propose a model of limited arbitrage based on financial relationships. Financially constrained arbitrageurs may choose to seek additional financing from banks that have the technology to profit from the strategies themselves. A holdup problem arises because banks cannot commit to providing capital. To minimize competition, arbitrageurs will choose to stay constrained and underinvest in the arbitrage unless banks have sufficient reputational capital. This problem arises when mispricing is largest. More competition among financiers, higher arbitrageur wealth, and allowing for explicit contracts can worsen the holdup problem. When arbitrage is risky, financial relationships are more valuable, mitigating the problem

A blockchain replaces central counterparties with time-consuming consensus protocols to record the transfer of ownership. This settlement latency slows cross-exchange trading, exposing arbitrageurs to price risk. Off-chain settlement, instead, exposes arbitrageurs to costly default risk. We show with Bitcoin network and order book data that cross-exchange price differences coincide with periods of high settlement latency, asset flows chase arbitrage opportunities, and price differences across exchanges with low default risk are smaller. Blockchain-based trading thus faces a dilemma: Reliable consensus protocols require time-consuming settlement latency, leading to arbitrage limits. Circumventing such arbitrage costs is possible only by reinstalling trusted intermediation, which mitigates default risk

This paper characterizes equilibria in the Shleifer-Vishny model of limits of arbitrage. To prove existence, one has to consider types of equilibria ignored by Shleifer and Vishny, even if one adopts their parameter restrictions. For example, the only equilibrium may be one in which maximization of expected wealth requires an “all-or-nothing” investment strategy, with intermediate investment levels being strictly unprofitable. If one goes beyond Shleifer and Vishny's parameter restrictions, multiple equilibria may arise, and equilibrium selection may be governed by sunspots. Moreover, there may exist an equilibrium in which the asset price returns to fundamentals despite worsening noise trader sentiment

This paper examines the determinants of the time it takes for an index options market to return to no arbitrage values after put-call parity deviations, using intraday transactions data from the French index options market. We employ survival analysis to characterize how limits to arbitrage influence the expected duration of arbitrage deviations. After controlling for conventional limits to arbitrage, we show that liquidity-linked variables are associated with a faster reversion of arbitrage profits. The introduction of an Exchange Traded Fund also affects the survival rates of deviations, but this impact essentially stems from the reduction in the level of potential arbitrage profits

Corners were prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. We first develop a rational expectations model of corners and show that they can arise as the result of rational behavior. Then, using a novel hand-collected data set, we investigate price and trading behavior around several well-known stock market and commodity corners which occurred between 1863 and 1980. We find strong evidence that large investors and corporate insiders possess market power that allows them to manipulate prices. Manipulation leading to a market corner tends to increase market volatility and has an adverse price impact on other assets. We also find that the presence of large investors makes it risky for would-be short sellers to trade against the mispricing. Therefore, regulators and exchanges need to be concerned about ensuring that corners do not take place since they are accompanied by severe price distortions.

The distress anomaly reflects the abnormally low returns of high credit risk stocks during financial distress. Evidence from stocks and corporate bonds reinforces the anomaly and challenges rationales based on shareholders’ ability to extract value from bondholders, time-varying betas, lottery-type preferences, biased earnings expectations, and limits-to-arbitrage. Moreover, mispricing of distressed stocks and bonds is associated with excess investment and excess external financing. Potential real distortions are materially understated when assessed based only on equity mispricing. We emphasize the important role of corporate bonds in dissecting the distress anomaly, and show that the anomaly is an unresolved puzzle

Several recent studies document that sorting stocks first on certain stock-level characteristics and then on past returns results in elevated momentum profits. We show that such strategies enhance momentum profits simply by trading in stocks with more extreme past returns. Adjusted for this effect, elevated momentum profits resulting from characteristics (size, R2, turnover, age, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, market-to-book, price, illiquidity, credit rating) disappear almost entirely. Interaction patterns have been used to support behavioral and limits-to-arbitrage explanations of momentum; our findings imply that explanations of momentum should instead focus on the link between momentum profits and extreme past returns

We are delighted to announce that the winner of the 2010 Deutsche Bank Best Paper Award is: “Corporate Governance Externalities” by Viral Acharya and Paolo Volpin which appeared in issue 1 of Volume 14 and was voted by the editorial board as the best article published in the last four issues of the Review of Finance. The two runners-up for the award were: “Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fundamentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt” by Jens Hilscher and Yves Nosbusch and “The Limits of the Limits of Arbitrage” by Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton and Si Li The awards were presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the European Finance Association in Frankfurt on August 27th. We are grateful to the Deutsche Bank Foundation for sponsoring this award