Knowledge that Transforms

The Society for Financial Studies (SFS) is a global, nonprofit academic society in finance. It owns and runs three academic journals: (1) the Review of Asset Pricing Studies, (2) the Review of Corporate Finance Studies, and (3) the Review of Financial Studies. It also organizes two annual academic conferences: (1) the SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific and (2) the SFS Cavalcade North America. It also runs several smaller, specialized conferences and financially supports and co-sponsors other independent conferences. Its governing board is the SFS Council. SFS holds an annual membership meeting in May every year. At that meeting the SFS President, Executive Editors, Cavalcade Chair, and Secretary-Treasurer report on SFS activities. This year, for the first time, we have written up those reports and integrated them into this annual report of the Society for Financial Studies, which will be published in all three SFS journals. The reasons for doing this are to share this information more broadly with SFS members and friends and to create a permanent record for the long run (that is, institutional memory).

Abstract We study how listing in multiple markets affects the dynamics between firms’ credit default swap (CDS) and stock returns. We find that cross-listing increases (1) the sensitivity of CDS to stock returns, (2) the integration of CDS with world equity and bond markets, and (3) the statistical synchronicity of CDS and stock prices. Our results are stronger for firms with greater media attention, analyst and CDS coverage, and Google search intensity and for listings in familiar markets. We suggest that a firm’s presence in global equity markets comes with an improvement in the credit-equity integration through a reduction of informational frictions. Received April 20, 2017; editorial decision February 12, 2019 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years. (JEL G18, G30, G32, E22) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We show that global political uncertainty, measured by the U.S. election cycle, on average, leads to a fall in equity returns in fifty non-U.S. countries. At the same time, market volatilities rise, local currencies depreciate, and sovereign bond returns increase. The effect of global political uncertainty on equity prices increases with the level of uncertainty in U.S. election outcomes and a country’s equity market exposure to foreign investors, but does not vary with the country’s international trade exposure. These findings suggest that global political uncertainty increases investors’ aggregate risk aversion, leading to a flight to safety.(JEL F30, F36, G12, G15, G18) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract This paper investigates why industrial firms conduct Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investment in entrepreneurial companies. I test alternative views on CVC by exploiting the entry, investment, and termination decisions of CVC divisions. CVC entry concentrates in firms that experience deteriorations of internal innovation. At the investment stage, CVCs select startups with a similar technological focus but that have a non-overlapping knowledge base, and they integrate technologies generated from these ventures that create strategic value. CVCs are terminated when parent firms’ innovation recovers. Overall, the strategic desire to fix innovation weaknesses after adverse shocks motivates firms to adopt CVCs. Received November 15, 2017; editorial decision March 2, 2019 by Editor Francesca Cornelli. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We analyze how the costs of smoothly adjusting capital, such as incentive costs, affect investment timing. In our model, the owner of a firm holds a real option to increase a lumpy form of capital and can also smoothly adjust an incremental form of capital. Increasing the cost of incremental capital can delay or accelerate investment in lumpy capital. Incentive costs due to moral hazard are a natural source of costs for the accumulation of incremental capital. When moral hazard is severe, delaying investment in lumpy capital is costly, and overinvesting relative to the first-best case is optimal. Received January 24, 2017; editorial decision March 15, 2019 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Abstract We study investor redemptions and portfolio rebalancing decisions of prime money market mutual funds (MMFs) during the Eurozone crisis. We find that sophisticated investors selectively acquire information about MMFs’ risk exposures to Europe, which leads managers to withdraw funding from information-sensitive European issuers. That is, MMF managers, particularly those serving the most sophisticated investors, selectively adjust their portfolio risk exposures to avoid information-sensitive European risks, while maintaining or increasing risk exposures to other regions. This mechanism helps to explain the occurrence of selective “dry-ups” in debt markets where delegation is common and returns to information production are usually low. (JEL G01, G21, G23) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We use information from over 2 million trading strategies randomly generated using real data and from strategies that survive the publication process to infer the statistical properties of the set of strategies that could have been studied by researchers. Using this set, we compute t-statistic thresholds that control for multiple hypothesis testing, when searching for anomalies, at 3.8 and 3.4 for time-series and cross-sectional regressions, respectively. We estimate the expected proportion of false rejections that researchers would produce if they failed to account for multiple hypothesis testing to be about 45%.

Abstract We study the role of financial frictions for productivity. Using a rich cross-country firm-level data, we exploit variation in preexisting exposure to the 2008 global financial crisis to study the post-crisis productivity slowdown. Firms with weaker precrisis balance sheets experienced a highly persistent decline in post-crisis total factor productivity growth relative to their less vulnerable counterparts, accounting for about one-third of the within-firm productivity slowdown. This decline was larger for firms that faced a more severe tightening of credit conditions. Financially fragile firms cut back on innovation activities, one channel through which financial frictions weakened post-crisis productivity growth.

Abstract We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these scarring effects can be ascribed to a drop in asset managers’ reputation. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.