Using a dataset of 28,635 firms in 45 countries, this study investigates the motivations for family-controlled business groups. We provide new evidence consistent with the argument that particular group structures emerge not only to perpetuate control, but also to alleviate financing constraints at the country and firm levels. At the country level, family groups, especially those structured as pyramids, are more prevalent in markets with limited availability of capital. At the firm level, investment intensity is greater for firms held in pyramidal rather than in horizontal structures, reflecting the financing advantages of the former. Within a pyramid, internal equity funding, investment intensity, and firm value all increase down the ownership chain. However, group firm performance declines when dual-class shares and cross shareholdings are employed as additional control-enhancing mechanisms.

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorship issues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstrate theoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance, the survivorship bias in average performance typically increases with the sample length. This is empirically relevant because evidence suggests a multiyear survival rule for U.S. mutual funds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07% for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. We find that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performance persistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affects the relation between performance and fund characteristics.

We estimate the effect of carbon pricing policy on bank credit to greenhouse-gas-emitting firms. Our analyses exploit the geographic restrictions inherent in California’s cap-and-trade bill and a discontinuity in the embedded free permit threshold of the federal Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill. Affected high emission firms face shorter loan maturities, lower access to permanent forms of bank financing, higher interest rates, and higher participation of shadow banks in their lending syndicates. These effects are concentrated among private firms, while credit terms of public firms are largely unaffected. Overall, we show that banks respond quickly to realizations of transition risk.

We document racial disparities in auto lending. Combining credit bureau records with borrower characteristics, we find that Black and Hispanic applicants’ approval rates are 1.5 percentage points lower, even after controlling for creditworthiness. In aggregate, this effect crowds out 80,000 minority loans each year. Results are stronger where racial biases are more prevalent and lending competition is lower. Minority borrowers pay 70-basis-point higher interest rates, but default less ceteris paribus, consistent with racial bias rather than statistical discrimination. A major antidiscrimination enforcement policy initiated in 2013, but halted in 2018, reduced unexplained racial differences in interest rates by 60%.

We test for pricing disparities in mortgage contracts using a novel data set that allows us to observe the race and ethnicity of both parties to the loan. We find that minorities pay between 3% and 5% more in fees than similarly qualified whites when obtaining a loan through the same white broker. Critically, we find that the premium paid by minorities depends on the race of the broker. We also examine recent policy changes around broker compensation rules that may not only reduce these price disparities but may also limit access to credit for minorities.

Using data from the Los Angeles area from 1988 to 2012, we study the behavior and sources of returns of individual investors in the housing market. We document the existence of two distinct investor types. The first act as middlemen, purchasing substantially below and reselling above market prices throughout the cycle, improving liquidity and the existing capital stock in the process. The second act as speculators, who primarily enter during the boom, buying and selling at essentially market prices. Neither type anticipated the housing bust. We document similar behavior by speculators and middlemen in 96 other U.S. metro areas.

We analyze a panel of over 28,400 S&P 500 return forecasts by CFOs to examine whether the extent of CFOs’ miscalibration—providing forecast confidence intervals that are too narrow—decreases over time. We find no improvement with task repetition nor evidence of learning, that is, no improvement in response to past performance. Across CFOs, miscalibration appears to be a persistent personal trait. We find some evidence that the degree of miscalibration is related to birth cohort and stock market familiarity.

Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are less likely to discipline ineffective directors with negative votes. Consequently, independent directors face weaker monitoring incentives and exhibit poor board performance; ineffective independent directors are also more frequently appointed. Moreover, we find that the adverse effects of investor distraction on various corporate governance outcomes are stronger among firms with problematic directors. Our findings suggest that institutional investor monitoring creates important director incentives to monitor.