We examine the extent to which a fund's cash flows are affected by the stellar performance of other funds in its family — and consequences of such spillovers. We show that star performance results in greater cash inflow to the fund and to other funds in its family. Moreover, families with higher variation in investment strategies across funds are shown to be more likely to generate star performance. We argue that spillovers may induce lower ability families to pursue star-creating strategies. Consistent with our conjecture, families with high variation in investment strategies across funds significantly underperform low-variation families.

There are two major institutional investors in the syndicated loan market: collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loan mutual funds. CLOs are closed-end funds while loan funds are open-end funds that issue claims that are redeemable on demand. In this paper, we examine whether CLOs provide arbitrage capital that contributes to the resilience of loan funds. We find that CLOs act as shock absorbers, providing liquidity through par-building trades when loan funds experience large outflows. However, CLO-provided liquidity is limited to par build–eligible loans, leading to potential flow-induced fire sales among par build–ineligible loans. (JEL G23, G38

We study how financial constraints affect the housing market by exploiting a regulatory change that increases the down payment requirement for homes selling for $$$1M or more. Using Toronto data, we find that the policy causes excess bunching of homes listed at $$$1M and heightened bidding intensity for these homes, but only a muted response in sales. While difficult to reconcile in a frictionless market, these findings are consistent with the implications derived from an equilibrium search model with auctions and financial constraints. Our analysis points to the importance of designing macroprudential policies that recognize the strategic responses of market participants.

We study how passive investing affects asset prices. Flows into passive funds disproportionately raise the stock prices of the economy’s largest firms, especially those large firms in high demand by noise traders. Because of this effect, the aggregate market can rise even when flows are entirely due to investors switching from active to passive funds. Intuitively, passive flows increase the idiosyncratic risk of large firms in high demand, which discourages investors from correcting the flows’ effects on prices. Consistent with our theory, prices and idiosyncratic volatilities of the largest S&P500 firms rise the most following flows into that index.

We construct firm-specific measures of expected equity returns using corporate bond yields, and replace standard ex post average returns with our expected-return measures in asset pricing tests. We find that the market beta is significantly priced in the cross section of expected returns. The expected size and value premiums are positive and countercyclical, but there is no evidence of positive expected momentum profits. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap—the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance. (JEL G11, G23) Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. For example, fund investors do not observe the exact timing of trades and the corresponding transaction costs. On the one hand, fund investors may benefit from unobserved interim trades by skilled fund managers who use their informational advantage to time the purchases and the sales of individual stocks optimally. On the other hand, they may bear hidden costs, such as trading costs, agency costs, and negative investor externalities. In this paper, we analyze the

Hedge fund teams with heterogeneous educational backgrounds, academic specializations, work experiences, genders, and races, outperform homogeneous teams after adjusting for risk and fund characteristics. An event study of manager team transitions, instrumental variable regressions, and an analysis of managers who simultaneously operate solo- and team-managed funds address endogeneity concerns. Diverse teams deliver superior returns by arbitraging more stock anomalies, avoiding behavioral biases, and minimizing downside risks. Moreover, diversity allows hedge funds to circumvent capacity constraints and generate persistent performance. Our results suggest that diversity adds value in asset management.

We study the relation between mutual fund trades and mass media coverage of stocks. We find that funds exhibit persistent differences in their propensity to buy media-covered stocks. Moreover, this propensity is negatively related to their future performance. Funds in the highest propensity decile underperform funds in the lowest propensity decile by 1.1% to 2.8% per year. These results do not extend to fund sells, likely because of funds' inability to sell short. Overall, the findings suggest that professional investors are subject to limited attention.

We show that scale in active equity portfolios is understated by at least 65% because the majority of mutual funds have “twin” institutional vehicles (IVs) managed under the same strategies. Omitting these IVs can severely skew crucial estimates in asset management research: by including IV assets, diminishing returns to scale of active investments is significantly reduced, and dollar value added of active strategies is more substantial and persistent than previously suggested. We further show that IV assets meaningfully influence managers’ portfolio decisions. In addition, these measurement issues apply to common flow measures and extend to passive funds and bond funds.

We document political sentiment effects on U.S. inventors. Democratic inventors are more likely to patent (relative to Republicans) after the 2008 election of Obama but less likely after the 2016 election of Trump. These effects are at least twice as strong among politically active Democrats and are present even within firms and within firm$ × $technology. We also show that partisans tend to cluster in technologies (e.g., Democrats in Biotechnology and Republicans in Weapons), so that sentiment effects aggregate to more patents in the technologies dominated by the winning party.