We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.

We analyze the role of “directors from related industries” (DRIs) on a firm's board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream/downstream industries of the firm. DRIs are more likely when the information gap vis-à-vis related industries is more severe or the firm has greater market power. DRIs have a significant impact on firm value/performance, especially when information problems are worse. Furthermore, DRIs help firms handle industry shocks and shorten their cash conversion cycles. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms choose DRIs when the adverse effects due to conflicts of interest are dominated by the benefits due to DRIs' information and expertise.

The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be a highly unstable source of funds in times of stress. In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model and analyze under what conditions such instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in expectations. We derive a liquidity constraint and a collateral constraint that determine whether such expectations-driven runs are possible and show that they depend crucially on the microstructure of particular funding markets that we examine in detail. This provides insights into the differences between the tri-party repo market and the bilateral repo market, which were both at the heart of the recent financial crisis

We test a frog-in-the-pan (FIP) hypothesis that predicts investors are inattentive to information arriving continuously in small amounts. Intuitively, we hypothesize that a series of frequent gradual changes attracts less attention than infrequent dramatic changes. Consistent with the FIP hypothesis, we find that continuous information induces strong persistent return continuation that does not reverse in the long run. Momentum decreases monotonically from 5.94% for stocks with continuous information during their formation period to –2.07% for stocks with discrete information but similar cumulative formation-period returns. Higher media coverage coincides with discrete information and mitigates the stronger momentum following continuous information.

This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporating three critical elements of this industry: (1) the rating agencies' ability to misreport the issuer's credit quality, (2) their ability to issue unsolicited ratings, and (3) their reputational concerns. We analyze the incentives of credit rating agencies to issue unsolicited credit ratings and the effects of this practice on the agencies' rating strategies. We find that issuance of unfavorable unsolicited credit ratings enables rating agencies to extract higher fees from issuers by credibly threatening to punish those that refuse to acquire a rating. Also, issuing unfavorable unsolicited ratings increases the rating agencies' reputation by demonstrating to investors that they resist the temptation to issue inflated ratings. In equilibrium, unsolicited credit ratings are lower than solicited ratings, because all favorable ratings are solicited; however, they do not have a downward bias. We show that, under certain conditions, a credit rating system that incorporates unsolicited ratings leads to more stringent rating standards

We examine the role of high-frequency traders (HFTs) in price discovery and price efficiency. Overall HFTs facilitate price efficiency by trading in the direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors, both on average and on the highest volatility days. This is done through their liquidity demanding orders. In contrast, HFTs' liquidity supplying orders are adversely selected. The direction of HFTs' trading predicts price changes over short horizons measured in seconds. The direction of HFTs' trading is correlated with public information, such as macro news announcements, market-wide price movements, and limit order book imbalances.

We analyze time-series of investor expectations of future stock market returns from six data sources between 1963 and 2011. The six measures of expectations are highly positively correlated with each other, as well as with past stock returns and with the level of the stock market. However, investor expectations are strongly negatively correlated with model-based expected returns. We reconcile the evidence by calibrating a simple behavioral model, in which fundamental traders require a premium to accommodate expectations shocks from extrapolative traders, but markets are not efficient.

We propose a new measure of time-varying tail risk that is directly estimable from the cross-section of returns. We exploit firm-level price crashes every month to identify common fluctuations in tail risk among individual stocks. Our tail measure is significantly correlated with tail risk measures extracted from S&P 500 index options and negatively predicts real economic activity. We show that tail risk has strong predictive power for aggregate market returns. Cross-sectionally, stocks with high loadings on past tail risk earn an annual three-factor alpha 5.4% higher than stocks with low tail risk loadings. We explore potential mechanisms giving rise to these asset pricing facts.

We analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market—some trade for speculation and others for hedging—and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.

We study how a firm's decision to offer bonds of various maturities affects the portfolio allocations of institutional investors. We argue that because of lower information-collection costs, institutional investors tilt their portfolios towards firms that offer bonds of various maturities. We show that this translates into lower bond yields, both in the primary and in the secondary bond markets.