Knowledge that Transforms

Performance-contingent cash and tangible rewards are commonly used to motivate employees, and the taxation of such rewards is unavoidable. We use two experiments to examine how the effect of reward taxation on employee effort varies by reward type. In Experiment 1, we find reward taxation decreases positive affect, increases negative affect, and decreases reward attractiveness for employees when rewards are tangible, but not when rewards are cash. In Experiment 2, we find reward taxation reduces employee effort when rewards are tangible, but not when rewards are cash. Collectively, this evidence advances knowledge at the intersection of tax and management accounting by explaining why reward type alters the effect of reward taxation on employee effort. Moreover, our experimental results inform managers of a potential downside to using tangible rewards to motivate employees. Data Availability: Authors will make data available on request.

We conceptualize equity incentive contracting as a dynamic process in which contracting frictions limit the speed at which equity incentives adjust to target levels. Slower adjustment speeds imply more prolonged deviations from value-maximizing targets and thus more severe negative effects on future performance. We find that contracting frictions significantly slow the speed of adjustment to target incentives (SOA). Consistent with frictions prolonging the persistence of deviations from target, we find that contracting frictions magnify the negative influence of deviations on future firm performance. Further, we find that the influence of contracting frictions on SOA operates through boards’ equity grant decisions. Our dynamic contracting perspective offers new insight into the relation between CEO incentives and firm performance by providing novel evidence that the speed of convergence to target incentives is a defining feature of the dynamic contracting process that translates inefficiency effects of contracting frictions into lower future performance. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

We examine the relationship between competition and reward practices in the public education sector. We hypothesize and find that school principals who face more intense competition make greater use of performance-based financial rewards and apply greater differentiation in its distribution between higher versus lower performing teachers. However, we do not find similar evidence for nonfinancial rewards. Further analyses suggest that financial rewards help attract and retain teachers in the face of competition. We also hypothesize and find that, as competition intensifies, principals direct incentives toward student outcomes that are easier to measure and communicate (student achievement) as well as their key determinant (teacher competence), relative to outcomes that are harder to measure and communicate (student well-being and engagement). Our findings suggest that school principals view financial incentives as effective for gaining a competitive edge and that competition can influence the relative importance they place on different student outcomes.

To better understand supervisors’ outcome bias, I use a regression discontinuity design that compares coaches’ performance assessments of professional football players involved in narrow wins and losses. I document that supervisors over-react to negative outcomes, sharply lowering performance ratings and tripling subordinate turnover. I find that supervisors’ evaluations that subjectively incorporate information from more incomplete objective performance measures are more prone to outcome bias than those that draw on less incomplete objective measures. I also document that supervisors’ evaluations of high-performing team members are more prone to outcome bias than supervisors’ evaluations of low performers. Finally, I find that outcomes affect supervisors’ ex post information collection. My findings, consistent with predictions that I derive from the theory of cognitive reconstruction, shed light on supervisors’ outcome bias in team settings and how effectively firms’ use of objective performance measures, direct monitoring, and information gathering can mitigate this bias.

We examine the role of investor relations (IR) in private debt markets. We find that firms with dedicated IR officers (IROs) receive significantly lower loan spreads, particularly when lenders require a better understanding of the borrower’s risk profile. Among firms with IROs, those with longer tenured officers experience lower spreads, especially when IROs also manage financial responsibilities. To address endogeneity concerns, we demonstrate that loan spreads decline when a firm establishes an IR program and rise when the program is discontinued. Furthermore, when a different individual assumes the IRO role, loan spreads increase, even though there are no reductions in firm disclosure. Loans issued to firms with IROs also have shorter syndication duration, attract more nonrelationship, foreign, and nonbank participant lenders, feature more customized covenants, and are less likely to undergo renegotiation. Overall, our study provides robust evidence of the relevance of IR in private debt markets.

This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments.

We use large, detailed data on individual auditor employment to examine the antecedents of turnover decisions and subsequent career paths of diverse individuals in public accounting—namely women and racial/ethnic minority groups (Asian, Black, and Hispanic). Despite investments in diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) recruiting by firms, we observe a higher likelihood of turnover among diverse auditors. Consistent with the principle of homophily, we find that same-group representation is crucial in retaining diverse auditors. These individuals are less likely to leave when surrounded by peers and leaders of the same group and are more likely to join an organization with greater same-group representation. We also find that most individuals leave the audit profession, but those who stay longer have higher seniority later in their careers—suggesting that extended tenure could mutually benefit firms and individuals. Our findings offer valuable insight for firms seeking to promote DEI while improving retention rates.

Whether audit firms should disclose financial statements is controversial among investors, practitioners, and regulators. The debate centers on whether audit firms’ financial statements provide information about audit quality. Using hand-collected data from U.K. audit firms’ financial statements, we construct four measures that capture audit firms’ resource investments (i.e., human capital, workplace environment, technologies) and risk exposures (i.e., litigation provisions). We find that increases in audit firms’ staff costs, investments in tangible assets and IT software, and reductions in litigation provisions are associated with improved audit quality. The information in audit firms’ financial statements is not contained in their transparency reports or regulatory inspection reports. Additional tests show that increases in audit firms’ staff costs and tangible assets, as well as reductions in litigation provisions, are associated with improved audit efficiency.

Prior research finds that audit offices lose market share after they are involved in alleged audit failures. We examine whether such reputation effects are driven by private communications from rival auditors. We determine which offices are likely to be well informed about alleged audit failures by identifying the incoming office of the client accused of misreporting and by identifying law firm connections between each audit firm and the plaintiffs and defendants in each lawsuit. Consistent with private communications being a driver of auditor reputation effects, we find that tainted offices lose significantly more market share to rival offices that are likely to be informed about the alleged audit failure.

ASC 842 requires firms to collect and analyze lease contracts for accounting classification, measurement, and recognition purposes. Leveraging the implementation of ASC 842, I examine firms’ internal accounting hiring and its impact on the efficiency of lease management. I find that the standard prompts lease-intensive firms to significantly increase their internal accounting hiring, which enhances lease-related financial reporting quality. Moreover, firms that increased accounting hiring achieve greater efficiency in managing leases than those that implemented the standard without such hiring. This efficiency gain is incremental to improvements from concurrent information system upgrades and is more pronounced in firms with greater cost-saving opportunities and those that hire more experienced accountants. These results highlight that the benefits of internal accounting hiring extend beyond financial reporting, improving firms’ operational decisions.