Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether outstanding employee stock options (ESOs), which represent the firm’s contractual obligation to deliver shares upon ESO exercise, affect firms’ credit ratings. I hypothesize that outstanding ESOs play two information roles—(1) suggesting equity infusion, and (2) predicting share repurchases—that help credit-rating agencies evaluate the issuing company’s debt service ability. Consistent with these hypothesized roles, results indicate that the present values of expected cash proceeds and tax benefits from ESO exercise have favorable effects on credit ratings. In contrast, the present value of the expected cost of ESO-related share repurchases has an unfavorable effect on credit ratings and this unfavorable effect is more pronounced for firms with a greater tendency to repurchase shares. The after-tax fair value of outstanding ESOs, which summarizes the effects of the above three ESO-related cash flows, is negatively associated with credit ratings. Taken together, these findings are consistent with credit-rating agencies incorporating the information conveyed by outstanding ESOs regarding potential equity infusion and ESO-related repurchases in their credit risk assessments and assigning lower credit ratings to firms with greater values of outstanding ESOs.

ABSTRACT: We hypothesize and provide evidence that characteristics of banks’ loan securitizations accounted for as sales determine the extent to which banks retain the risks of the securitized loans. We show that banks retain more risk when: (1) the types of loans have higher and/or less externally verifiable credit risk, (2) the loans are closed-ended and banks retain larger contractual interests in the loans, and (3) the loans are closed-ended and banks retain types of contractual interests that more strongly concentrate the risk of the securitized loans. We show that the magnitude and type of retained contractual interests are not risk-relevant in revolving loan securitizations, because banks have more incentive and ability to provide implicit recourse, a non-contractual interest.

Two separate streams of research find evidence that firms decrease R&D spending to meet earnings benchmarks and that the R&D tax credit increases R&D spending. However, these studies do not consider stock option exercises by R&D employees that likely influence R&D spending decisions because they increase R&D tax credits without reducing reported earnings. This study extends both areas of research by incorporating R&D tax credits from stock option exercises into the R&D spending decision. We find evidence that firms reduce R&D spending by 0.46 percent of total assets to avoid earnings decreases, but R&D tax credits generated by stock option exercises offset this decrease by 16 percent on average and up to 42 percent for a fully taxable firm. The results of this study suggest that the tax benefits of R&D-related stock option exercises are important considerations in studies that investigate myopic R&D investment and in studies that investigate the effect of the R&D tax credit on R&D spending.

ABSTRACT: We characterize the operating-activities section of the indirect-approach statement of cash flows as backward because it presents reconciling adjustments in a way that is opposite from the intuitively appealing, future-oriented, Conceptual Framework definitions of assets, liabilities, and the accruals process. We propose that the reversed-accruals orientation required in the currently mandated indirect-approach statement of cash flows is unnecessarily complex, causing information-processing problems that result in increased cash flow forecast error and dispersion. We also predict that the mixed pattern (i.e., +/−, −/+) of operating cash flows and operating accruals reported by most companies impedes investors’ ability to learn the time-series properties of cash flows and accruals. We conduct a carefully controlled experiment and find that (1) cash flow forecasts have lower forecast error and dispersion when the indirect-approach statement of cash flows starts with operating cash flows and adds changes in accruals to arrive at net income and (2) cash flow forecasts have lower forecast error and dispersion when the cash flows and accruals are of the same sign (i.e., +/+, −/−); with the sign-based difference attenuated in the forward-oriented statement of cash flows. We also conduct a quasi-experiment to test our mixed-sign versus same-sign hypotheses using archival samples of publicly available I/B/E/S and Value Line cash flow forecasts. We find that the passively observed samples of cash flow forecasts exhibit a similar pattern of mixed-sign versus same-sign forecast error as documented in our experiment.

We study the role of borrower accounting quality in debt contracting. Specifically, we examine how accounting quality affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt market and how the design of debt contracts vary with accounting quality in the two markets. We find that accounting quality affects the choice of the market, with poorer accounting quality borrowers preferring private debt, i.e., bank loans. This is consistent with banks possessing superior information access and processing abilities that reduce adverse selection costs for borrowers. We also find that accounting quality has an economically significant but differential impact on contract design in the two markets consistent with differences in recontracting flexibility across the two markets. In the case of private debt, since there is greater recontracting flexibility, both the price (i.e., interest) and non-price (i.e., maturity and collateral) terms are significantly more stringent for poorer accounting quality borrowers, unlike public debt where only the price terms are more stringent. The impact of accounting quality on interest spreads of public debt is 2.5 times that of the private debt, since the price terms alone reflect the variation in accounting quality.

ABSTRACT: This study examines how two factors, the agents’ perceptions regarding the fairness of the principal and inter-agent communication, affect agents’ behaviors under a peer reporting system. Analytical models show that when agents can observe each other’s actions and local signals, a peer reporting system with a verification mechanism (using one agent’s information to verify the other’s) and a reward for truthful whistleblowing can induce agents to report honestly and thereby help the principal achieve the first-best outcome. However, behavioral research suggests that the agents’ perception regarding the fairness of the principal, as well as communication among agents, may affect how honestly agents report. The results of my experiment show that, under a peer reporting system with a high reward for whistleblowing, the agents’ perception regarding the fairness of the principal positively affects the agents’ reporting honesty and negatively affects their explicit attempts at collusion. Communication between agents decreases their reporting honesty when the principal is perceived as unfair, but not when the principal is perceived as fair.

ABSTRACT: The literature suggests that staggered boards may have two opposite effects on earnings management: the expropriation view emphasizes the exacerbating effect, whereas the quiet life view advocates the mitigating effect. We use two approaches to examine this issue: a small-sample test based on whether firms are accused of committing financial reporting fraud, and a large-sample test based on the absolute value of unexpected accruals. We find that staggered boards are associated with lower likelihoods of committing fraud and smaller magnitudes of absolute unexpected accruals. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value. The results suggest that staggered boards may enable managers to enjoy the quiet life and lessen their motivation to increase firm value; as a consequence, managers are not motivated to manage earnings.

ABSTRACT: The trend toward continuous monitoring of automated business transactions by the internal audit function is growing as organizations seek to improve internal control. In this study, we demonstrate that continuous monitoring and the time horizon over which performance-contingent incentives are based can interact, thereby yielding potential functional and dysfunctional effects on managerial decisions. Seventy-two experienced corporate managers completed a between-participants experiment that randomized monitoring frequency (periodic or continuous) and incentive horizon (short-term or long-term). We found that earnings management of real activities significantly decreased as the frequency of monitoring increased in the presence of a short-term incentive horizon—a functional effect. However, with a long-term incentive horizon, the participants’ willingness to change the current level of investment in a risky but viable project significantly dropped as the frequency of monitoring increased, even though additional investment would enhance the likelihood of the project’s eventual success—a dysfunctional effect. We also observed that more frequent monitoring significantly decreased the willingness of managers to continue with a risky but viable project regardless of incentive horizon and the effect was significantly pronounced in the presence of a short-term, relative to long-term, incentive horizon—another dysfunctional consequence. Implications of the research findings to theory and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

Regulatory officials and market analysts have speculated that the loss of credibility in subsequently reported financial information is a long-lasting consequence of earnings restatements. I measure the information content of earnings using a standard earnings-returns framework over several years surrounding restatements to examine characteristics of the decline in the information content of earnings. Results indicate that although the information content of earnings declines following restatements, the loss is temporary. In particular, the earnings response coefficients for earnings announcements surrounding restatements exhibit a U-shaped pattern in which they are no longer significantly lower in the post-restatement period over an average of four quarters. The extent to which the earnings of restatement firms suffer a loss of information content varies across several dimensions. First, the duration of the loss is greater for firms that restate earnings to correct revenue recognition errors and for restatements that result in a large decline in the stock price at the announcement date. Second, there is not a loss in the information content of earnings for firms that make changes to their financial reporting governance structures following restatements. Overall, the evidence in this paper is consistent with a short-term decline in investor confidence regarding financial reporting following restatements, but shows that suspicion regarding the information loss of post-restatement earnings in the long-term is unwarranted.