Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We examine how the relationship between competition and risk-taking changes with the ex ante bank equity capital ratio. We show that competition in the banking market, on average, mitigates risk-taking by banks. This relationship, however, can be altered by a bank’s ex ante equity capital ratio. More specifically, when face with increased competition, banks with low ex ante equity capital ratios engage in relatively larger reductions in risk-taking. They do so primarily by decreasing the risk in their lending portfolios. In contrast, banks with high enough ex ante equity capital ratios might not reduce their risk-taking at all. (JEL G21, G32, O16, D40, G18)

Abstract We document that nearly half of U.S. public firms were eligible for the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) in 2020, with 41.8% of those eligible choosing to borrow. Consistent with the program’s objectives, borrowers tended to be smaller with less cash, higher leverage, and fewer investment opportunities. In addition, firm values declined upon PPP loan announcement and borrowers grew slower in 2020 relative to nonborrowers. We document that 13.5% of PPP borrowers, in particular those facing more public scrutiny, returned their loans after public backlash. Overall, concerns of reputational harm appeared to dissuade eligible public firms from availing emergency government funding. (JEL E61, E65, G38, H81)

Abstract This paper examines how the firm’s choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately informed, multitasking managers and the labor market. Two main results surface. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so short-termism involves lower agency costs and is value maximizing for some firms. Second, when firms compete for managers, firms practicing short-termism attract better managerial talent when talent is unobservable, but larger firms that invest in long-horizon projects hire more talented managers when talent is revealed. (JEL D82, D86, G31, G32, J41) Received July 25, 2019; editorial decision July 7, 2020 by Editor Uday Rajan.

Abstract We investigate whether suppliers adjust innovative supply chain investment following stock market signals about customers’ economic prospects. We show that suppliers increase R&D and investment in customer-related patents after positive market reactions to customers’ new product announcements. A battery of falsification tests suggest that spurious factors are unlikely to explain our results. Market signals about customers appear more important when information asymmetry is greater, when suppliers face greater competitive threats, and when suppliers are financially unconstrained. Our evidence suggests that the stock market can be a viable source of information to mitigate supply chain frictions. (JEL G14, G30, L14)

Abstract We empirically examine bank CEOs’ compensation. We find that bank CEOs (a) are paid less than their nonfinancial counterparts, an effect driven by the CEOs of small bank; (b) experienced declining compensation during 2007–2009 (the hardest-hit banks cut compensation more) but pay is now 24% higher than precrisis levels; (c) are paid more at larger banks, those with less nonperforming loans, those with a higher proportion of noninterest income, and those with less demand-deposit dependence; and (d) have pay highly sensitive to ROA and ROE, but not stock returns. Tail risk is higher when compensation depends more on short-term measures of performance. (JEL, F34, G32, G33, G38, K42)

Abstract We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds competing for investor flow. Competition for flow affects the manner in which activist funds govern as blockholders. In particular, funds inflate their short-term performance by increasing payouts that are financed by higher (net) leverage. Doing so subsequently discourages value-creating interventions during economic downturns because of debt overhang. Our theory suggests a new channel via which asset manager incentives may foster economic fragility and links together the observed procyclicality of activist investments with the documented effect of such funds on the leverage of their target companies. (JEL G34, G23) Received July 2, 2020; editorial decision August 8, 2020; Editor Uday Rajan.

Abstract We analyze an initiative by insurance regulators to reform capital regulations for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by replacing credit ratings with third-party estimates of expected credit losses and by considering an insurer’s exposure to future losses when determining regulatory capital. After implementation, insurers are less likely to sell distressed MBS, gains trade corporate bonds, and/or raise external financing. However, the new regime allows insurers to purchase more low-rated MBS at significant capital savings and insurers with greater capital savings are more likely to do so. Our analysis highlights the potential costs and benefits of an alternative methodology for determining regulatory capital. JEL (G11, G18, G22, G28, G32, G38). Received May 6, 2019; editorial decision April 4, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Abstract Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals, announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42) Received September 28, 2019; editorial decision May 27, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

Abstract In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales mainly aimed at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones. Increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones with similar sizes and levels of riskiness and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis. (JEL G01, G12, G14, G18) Received July 8, 2020; editorial decision September 8, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

Abstract This paper studies the effect of common ownership on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that common ownership is positively associated with a firm’s CSR score. The effect is stronger for firms in more competitive industries. We propose a two-stage duopoly game in which CSR serves as a commitment device to expand output aggressively to understand the empirical results. (JEL G30, D21, D22, L13, L21, L22) Received December 10, 2019; editorial decision September 9, 2020 by Editor: Gregor Matvos. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.