Prior to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, many U.S. states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate-of-return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long-distance markets and adopting price regulation (price caps and price freezes). Using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services, I investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators' rate structures. I find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross-subsidization present in local telephone markets. In addition, the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition.

The use of incentive regulation and other alternative regulatory programs in U.S. electricity markets has grown during the past two decades. Within a stochastic frontier framework, I investigate the effect of individual programs on the technical efficiency of a large set of coal and natural gas generation units. I find that those programs tied directly to generator performance and those that modify traditional fuel cost pass-through programs, to provide a greater incentive to reduce fuel costs, are associated with greater efficiency levels. Other programs have no statistical association with efficiency levels.

We document the numerical challenges we experienced estimating random-coefficient demand models as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) using two well-known data sets and a thorough optimization design. The optimization algorithms often converge at points where the first- and second-order optimality conditions fail. There are also cases of convergence at local optima. On convergence, the variation in the values of the parameter estimates translates into variation in the models' economic predictions. Price elasticities and changes in consumer and producer welfare following hypothetical merger exercises vary at least by a factor of 2 and up to a factor of 5.

We investigate the effects of automobile congestion on ambient air pollution and local infant mortality rates using data from California spanning 2002 to 2007. Constructing instrumental variables (IV) using the relationship of traffic, weather conditions, and pollutants, we show that particulate matter, even at modern levels, has large marginal effects on weekly infant mortality rates, especially for premature or low birthweight infants. We also find suggestive evidence of large effects for carbon monoxide, though results are imprecise. Finally, we check estimate sensitivity to nonclassical measurement error in local pollution and show that our IV results are robust to such concerns.

Climate policy has favored costly measures that implicitly or explicitly subsidize lowcarbon fuels.We simulate four transportation sector policies: cap and trade (CAT), ethanol subsidies, a renewable fuel standard (RFS), and a lowcarbon fuel standard. Our simulations confirm that alternatives to CAT are 2.5 to 4 times more costly but are amenable to adoption due to right-skewed distributions of gains. We analyze voting on the Waxman-Markey (WM) CAT bill. Conditional on a district’s CAT gains, a district’s RFS gains are negatively correlated with the likelihood of voting for WM. Our analysis supports campaign contributions as a partial mechanism.