Prior to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, many U.S. states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate-of-return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long-distance markets and adopting price regulation (price caps and price freezes). Using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services, I investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators' rate structures. I find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross-subsidization present in local telephone markets. In addition, the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition.

The use of incentive regulation and other alternative regulatory programs in U.S. electricity markets has grown during the past two decades. Within a stochastic frontier framework, I investigate the effect of individual programs on the technical efficiency of a large set of coal and natural gas generation units. I find that those programs tied directly to generator performance and those that modify traditional fuel cost pass-through programs, to provide a greater incentive to reduce fuel costs, are associated with greater efficiency levels. Other programs have no statistical association with efficiency levels.

The price of oil increased more than 650 percent from 1972 to 1980. I review the policy discussion of the time through the lens of the printed press. I pay particular attention to whether gasoline taxes were “on the table” and how consumers viewed the different policies. Meaningful changes in gasoline taxes were on the table, but polling evidence at the time suggests that consumers preferred price controls, rationing and vehicle taxes. Given the saliency of rationing and vehicle taxes, it seems difficult to argue that these alternative polices were adopted because they hide their true costs.

This paper estimates the technological progress that has occurred since 1980 in the automobile industry and the trade-offs faced when choosing between fuel economy, weight, and engine power characteristics. The results suggest that if weight, horsepower, and torque were held at their 1980 levels, fuel economy could have increased by nearly 60 percent from 1980 to 2006. Once technological progress is considered, meeting the CAFE standards adopted in 2007 will require halting the trend in weight and engine power characteristics, but little more. In contrast, the standards recently announced by the new administration, while attainable, require nontrivial "downsizing.” JEL: L50, L60

We document the numerical challenges we experienced estimating random-coefficient demand models as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) using two well-known data sets and a thorough optimization design. The optimization algorithms often converge at points where the first- and second-order optimality conditions fail. There are also cases of convergence at local optima. On convergence, the variation in the values of the parameter estimates translates into variation in the models' economic predictions. Price elasticities and changes in consumer and producer welfare following hypothetical merger exercises vary at least by a factor of 2 and up to a factor of 5.

In this paper, we share our experience with merger simulations using a Random Coefficient Logit model on the demand side and assuming a static Bertrand game on the supply side. Drawing largely from our work in Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008), we show that different demand estimates obtained from different combinations of optimization algorithms and starting values lead to substantial differences in post-merger market outcomes using metrics such as industry profits, and change in consumer welfare and prices.

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors’ deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated by this strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a stand-alone operation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by small banks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher deposit account fees rather than increased deposit account base.

We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980’s, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade. The results highlight a perverse effect of price regulation.

We investigate the effects of automobile congestion on ambient air pollution and local infant mortality rates using data from California spanning 2002 to 2007. Constructing instrumental variables (IV) using the relationship of traffic, weather conditions, and pollutants, we show that particulate matter, even at modern levels, has large marginal effects on weekly infant mortality rates, especially for premature or low birthweight infants. We also find suggestive evidence of large effects for carbon monoxide, though results are imprecise. Finally, we check estimate sensitivity to nonclassical measurement error in local pollution and show that our IV results are robust to such concerns.

We investigate whether car buyers are myopic about future fuel costs. We estimate the effect of gasoline prices on short-run equilibrium prices of cars of different fuel economies. We then compare the implied changes in willingness-to-pay to the associated changes in expected future gasoline costs for cars of different fuel economies in order to calculate implicit discount rates. Using different assumptions about annual mileage, survival rates, and demand elasticities, we calculate a range of implicit discount rates similar to the range of interest rates paid by car buyers who borrow. We interpret this as showing little evidence of consumer myopia.