Knowledge that Transforms

We document average abnormal stock returns of 14% for international insurance firms designated as Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SII). These gains are associated with a fall in average default probability of 15.6%, and statistically weak and economically marginal increases in expected asset risk. Over the same event window, identical measures for other large insurance firms show no significant changes in equity returns or implied asset risk, but an increase in default probability of 27%. These results suggest that G-SII investors still perceive a net gain from TBTF protection, despite new compliance requirements and costs. Our evidence also suggests that these gains are driven primarily from reductions in default probability, as results are consistent with investor expectations that the new regulatory regime will limit moral hazard effects from the guaranty.

We examine how the threat of turnover affects bank CEOs' risk-taking behavior. Using a sample of 212 U.S. banks from 1995 to 2010, in contrast with prior studies focusing on non-banking firms, we find a non-monotonic relationship between CEO turnover threat and CEO risk-taking behavior in the banking industry. Bank CEOs increase their risk-taking when the perceived turnover threat is moderate but reduce risk-taking when turnover threat is more imminent. This effect tends to concentrate on banks with a majority of independent directors.

We study the relative importance of social factors (including household, workplace, and neighborhood peer effects) and personal characteristics (including age, gender, tax rates, and funds under management) for asset allocation decisions. The most important factors (in order) are household peer effects, personal characteristics and workplace peer effects. Neighborhood peer effects and financial advice play a less important role. We use instrumental variables for both household and workplace peer effects and find results that are consistent with causal peer effects.

Based on a large international sample, we examine the effects of CSR on the cost of equity under different levels of investor protection. In countries where investor protection is strong (poor), our results show that the cost of equity falls (rises) when a firm invests in CSR. Our findings are robust to alternative variable definitions, sample selection, analyst forecast bias, and various methodological specifications. We also demonstrate that the investor base channel is able to explain different outcomes regarding the relation between CSR and the cost of equity, and we derive implications for both financial practice and public policy.

We provide an equilibrium analysis of potential consequences from the introduction of a binding leverage ratio, as proposed in Basel III. If banks differ in their monitoring skills and their ability to successfully complete a risky investment project, a tighter leverage ratio does not only mitigate moral hazard arising from limited liability, but also carries an unintended consequence: high-quality banks are not allowed to absorb the entire supply of debt if it is too costly to issue new equity. This increases the market share of low-skilled bankers and decreases the average ability of operating banks. We further show that rising heterogeneity in the banking sector increases this negative effect.

This paper documents that the real option to have debt motivates some firms to remain debt-free, even when standard trade-off theory predicts that these firms should have leverage. The real option has a first-order effect similar to the effect of bankruptcy costs in addressing the zero-leverage puzzle: the observation that many firms seemingly forgo sizable debt benefits by remaining debt-free. The debt-free firms’ value includes the option whose value is derived from future debt benefits and hedging bankruptcy costs. This paper proposes an optimal timing model for having debt and finds support for the model’s predictions through calibrations and simulations.

We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms’ disclosures to distinguish between “forecast-like” (quantitative statements about earnings) and “other”, or non-forecast-like, FLS. We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that managers are more likely to alter the content than the form of FLS when uncertainty is higher. Our study indicates that incorporating other FLS into empirical measures provides a more comprehensive proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures.

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent claims in the literature, our analysis empirically reaffirms the presence of a causal relation between compensation convexity (vega) and firm risk.

We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures.

This paper investigates banks’ reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We augment a bank-run model with the bank’s reporting choices. We show that banks with intermediate fundamentals have stronger incentive to misreport than those in the two tails. Moreover, reporting discretion reduces panic-based runs, but excessive discretion also reduces fundamental-based runs. The optimal amount of reporting discretion increases in the bank’s vulnerability to panic-based runs. Finally, a given bank’s opportunistic use of reporting discretion exerts a negative externality on other banks. Our paper answers the call by Armstrong et al. (2016) and Bushman (2016) to understand better the effects of banks’ special features on their reporting choices.