Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a generalization of the rational expectations framework to allow for temporarily unstable paths. Our approach introduces multiplicative sunspot shocks and it yields drifting parameters and stochastic volatility. Then, we provide an econometric strategy to estimate this generalized model on the data. The methodology allows the data to choose between different possible alternatives: determinacy, indeterminacy, and temporary instability. We apply our methodology to US inflation dynamics in the 1970s through the lens of a simple New Keynesian model. When temporarily unstable paths are allowed, the data unambiguously select them to explain the stagflation period in the 1970s. (JEL D84, E12, E31, E32, E52)

This paper investigates the role of self-fulfilling expectations in sovereign bond markets. We consider a model of sovereign borrowing featuring endogenous debt maturity, risk-averse lenders, and self-fulfilling crises à la Cole and Kehoe (2000). In this environment, interest rate spreads are driven by both fundamental and nonfundamental risk. These two sources of risk have contrasting implications for the maturity structure of debt chosen by the government. Therefore, they can be indirectly inferred by tracking the evolution of debt maturity. We fit the model to Italian data and find that nonfundamental risk played a limited role during the 2008–2012 crisis. (JEL E43, E44, F34, G01, G15, H63)

Human capital differences across countries can appear large or small depending on measurement methods. This Reply clarifies key assumptions and conceptual distinctions across accounting approaches. Accounting-based arguments for small human capital differences are difficult to sustain. By contrast, large human capital differences are theoretically and empirically coherent. Non-accounting arguments against large human capital variation are examined and their weaknesses pinpointed. This Reply also suggests a fruitful way forward for this literature, providing a natural conception of human capital that integrates literatures on ideas and institutions with the accounting of Jones (2014). (JEL E24, I26, J24, J31)

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered. (JEL D44, D83)

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals reach a critical threshold or if there are large common shocks, even before the threshold is reached. The fat-tail assumption matters because it implies that large shocks make players more unsure about whether their payoffs are higher than others. This feature is crucial for large shocks to matter. (JEL C72, C73, D83)

We examine ways to measure the amount of information generated by a piece of news and the amount of uncertainty implicit in a given belief. Say a measure of information is valid if it corresponds to the value of news in some decision problem. Say a measure of uncertainty is valid if it corresponds to expected utility loss from not knowing the state in some decision problem. We axiomatically characterize all valid measures of information and uncertainty. We show that if measures of information and uncertainty arise from the same decision problem, then they are coupled in that the expected reduction in uncertainty always equals the expected amount of information generated. We provide explicit formulas for the measure of information that is coupled with any given measure of uncertainty and vice versa. Finally, we show that valid measures of information are the only payment schemes that never provide incentives to delay information revelation. (JEL D81, D83)

Sticky price models featuring heterogeneous firms and systematic firm-level productivity trends deliver radically different predictions for the optimal inflation rate than their popular homogenous-firm counterparts: (i) the optimal steady-state inflation rate generically differs from zero and (ii) inflation optimally responds to productivity disturbances. We show this by aggregating a heterogeneous-firm model with sticky prices in closed form. Using firm-level data from the US Census Bureau, we estimate the historically optimal inflation path for the US economy: the optimal inflation rate ranges between 1 percent and 3 percent per year and displays a downward trend over the period 1977–2015. (JEL C51, D24, D25, E31, E52)

We provide a revealed preference methodology for identifying beliefs and utilities that can vary across states. A notion of comparative informativeness is introduced that is weaker than the standard Blackwell ranking. We show that beliefs and state-dependent utilities can be identified using stochastic choice from two informational treatments, where one is strictly more informative than another. Moreover, if the signal structure is known, then stochastic choice from a single treatment is enough for identification. These results illustrate novel identification methodologies unique to stochastic choice. Applications include identifying biases in job hiring, loan approvals, and medical advice. (JEL D11, D82, D83, J23, M51)

This paper shows that a macro model with segmented financial markets can generate sizable movements in housing prices in response to changes in credit conditions. We establish theoretically that reductions in mortgage rates always have a positive effect on prices, whereas the relaxation of loan-to-value constraints has ambiguous effects. A quantitative version of the model under perfect foresight accounts for about one-half of the observed price increase in the United States in the 2000s. When we include shocks to expectations about housing finance conditions, the model’s ability to match house values improves significantly. The framework reconciles the observed disconnect between house prices and rents since, in general equilibrium, financial shocks can decrease rents and increase prices. (JEL E44, G21, R31)