Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines whether recent mergers between small and midsize accounting firms influence competition by increasing the number of firms that can compete with larger rivals in the U.S. public company audit market. I find that in-market mergers generate efficiencies that are reflected in a post-merger reduction in audit hours but not in reduced audit quality. For both in-market and out-of-market mergers, clients switching to post-merger firms are more likely to be accelerated filers and are significantly larger in terms of several proxies for size and complexity. Lastly, I find that an increase in market-level merger activity is associated with lower profitability of Big 4 firms operating in the same market but only in the smaller client segment. These findings suggest that recent mergers have actually increased competition in some segments of the audit market despite already high concentration and concerns about a lack of sufficient competition.

We examine employee responses to CEO activism, the increasingly common practice of CEOs taking public stances on socio-political issues. CEO activism may bolster employees' identification with their organizations and strengthen shared beliefs among employees. Alternatively, CEO activism may alienate employees if CEO stances contrast with employees' ideologies. We find that employee satisfaction is higher when CEOs engage in activism that is aligned with employees’ ideologies. Furthermore, firms with CEO activism experience a net inflow of productive, ideologically-aligned inventors, which contributes to increased firm-level innovation. The improvements in employee satisfaction and innovation constitute an important channel that connects aligned CEO activism to increased firm value.

This study presents a model in which behavioral investors shape their current expectations based on statistical analysis of historical non-disclosure events. Investors may hold overly optimistic expectations following a non-disclosure event, thereby disrupting unraveling toward forthcoming disclosures. While a regulator can mandate disclosure, this protective intervention has its drawbacks. Overprotection prevents investors from learning from losses and leads to cycles of high compliance followed by high mispricing when innovations in transactions render current regulations ineffective. An unregulated market, on the other hand, tends toward high transparency over time. The model further explains negative market reactions to regulation, an association between price drift and transparency, reversals in market confidence, and that regulators should favor laissez-faire in times of investor pessimism. Further implications are explored for regulations that facilitate learning and prevent cycles.

Prior research finds that auditors' social connections with their clients harms audit quality. We examine auditors' social connections with members of their clients' business community, a setting in which auditors' connections may improve audit quality. While social ties within a client's business community should improve auditor competency, they also threaten auditor independence. We test the effects of auditors' network connections on audit quality using data from China, where data on social connections and individual auditors are available. Auditors' business connections should be particularly beneficial in a relational economy like China, where clients heavily rely on social networks for contracting. We find that auditors with strong local business and government connections deliver higher quality audits as evidenced by fewer financial irregularities among their clients. Our findings are consistent with the improved competency that arises from auditors' business connections outweighing the potential costs of impaired auditor independence.

Guidance is an important and long-studied topic in the accounting literature. Call, Hribar, Skinner, and Volant (this issue) survey managers who provide guidance and those that do not to generate insights on the costs and benefits of providing guidance. For managers who do provide guidance, perceptions regarding guidance characteristics are elicited. Firm responses are connected to archival data sources, enabling cross-sectional analysis of survey responses and facilitating comparison of self-reported guidance with common guidance proxies in the archival literature. I discuss key insights from the survey, considering the limitations inherent in the survey method. I also clarify what is meant by the term guidance, how it differs from other forward-looking information and how researchers operationalize the guidance construct. I conclude by offering six research questions for future consideration based on the survey evidence.

This paper provides the first study on how management structure influences hedge fund performance and risk. We document that hedge funds less tied to traditional assets often choose solo management structures. Solo-managed funds outperform team-managed funds, exhibit better skills in market return, volatility, and crisis timing, and demonstrate greater activity in beta management, but have higher idiosyncratic and tail risks. They are also less likely to be liquidated, with fund flows less performance sensitive. Using a sample of switched funds, we find that fund performance, assets, and risk correlate with the management structure switching decision.

Interest in sustainability information, from investors, managers, researchers, and others, has been expanding rapidly. We discuss recent advances and open questions related to sustainability reporting and disclosure through the lens of a supply and demand framework. Our discussion builds on prior research on financial reporting and highlights unique aspects of the provision of sustainability information.

Forward‐looking information, often used by auditors to evaluate complex estimates and form conclusions about going‐concern audit report modifications, is commonly disclosed voluntarily by U.S. public companies. We experimentally examine how this disclosure behavior affects auditors’ skepticism toward such information. Prior research has shown that investors and analysts frequently interpret voluntarily disclosed forward‐looking information as credible. We demonstrate that auditors, in contrast, exhibit greater skepticism toward forecasted information that has been voluntarily disclosed (vs. mandatorily disclosed or held privately) because of their reduced trust in management, even when the forecasts align with prior year trends (vs. being more optimistic). Our results suggest that a manager's decision to disclose, rather than the disclosure content itself, leads to increased auditor skepticism. Our findings have implications not only for audit outcomes, but also for manager disclosure behavior, as increased auditor scrutiny could discourage future voluntary disclosure.

Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.

We exploit the introduction of the Payment Practices Disclosure Regulation in the United Kingdom (UK) to examine the effects of mandating disclosure of customer‐supplier payment practices. We find that nondisclosing small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) experience a reduction in their accounts receivable by 8.3%, consistent with an acceleration of their trade credit collections. Further, SMEs exhibit fewer financial constraints after the regulation. We survey managers from large firms and SMEs to understand the underlying mechanisms. The required disclosures raise large firms’ reputational concerns and shift the bargaining power between large firms and SMEs. Additionally, the new disclosures compel executives at large firms to scrutinize their own firms’ payment practices, leading to increased accountability and a stronger focus on timely payment among senior managers.