In periods characterized by diminished public market financing, small biotechnology firms appear to be more likely to fund R&D through alliances with major corporations rather than with internal funds (raised through the capital markets). We consider 200 alliance agreements entered into by biotechnology firms between 1980 and 1995. Agreements signed during periods of limited external equity financing are more likely to assign the bulk of the control to the larger corporate partner, and are significantly less successful than other alliances. These agreements are also disproportionately likely to be renegotiated if financial market conditions subsequently improve.

The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity differ dramatically across institutions. Using detailed, hitherto unexplored records, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of investor classes: endowments' annual returns are nearly 21% greater than average. Analysis of reinvestment decisions suggests that endowments (and to a lesser extent, public pensions) are better than other investors at predicting whether follow‐on funds will have high returns. The results are not primarily due to endowments' greater access to established funds, since they also hold for young or undersubscribed funds. Our results suggest that investors vary in their sophistication and potentially their investment objectives.

The Economics of Copyright "Fair Use" in a Networked World by Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner and Kevin M. Murphy. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 205-208 of American Economic Review, May 2002

Venture capital distributions, a legal form of insider trading, provides an ideal arena for examining the share price impact of transactions by informed parties. These sales, which occur after substantial run‐ups in share value, generate a substantial price reaction immediately around the event. In the months after distribution, returns apparently continue to be negative. When the short‐ and long‐run reactions are decomposed, they are consistent with the view that venture capitalists use inside information to time stock distributions: Distributions of firms brought public by lower quality underwriters and of less seasoned firms have more negative price reactions.

“Founder-friendly” venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.

Do impact investors seek impact, or merely “impact wash”? We provide systematic evidence on the nonfinancial determinants of impact investing. Impact investors focus on firms aligned with the priorities of the federal government and disproportionately invest in economically disadvantaged regions. While we find high levels of coinvestment between impact and traditional investors, we also show that impact investors influence the strategies of their traditional coinvestors, are more likely to fund firms in nascent industries, and invest countercyclically. Finally, we characterize investment heterogeneity based on a novel classification of impact investment theses, with a focus on climate, environment, and jobs and equity.