Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a general equilibrium model where entrepreneurs finance random investment opportunities using trade credit, bank-issued assets, or currency. They search for bank funding in over-the-counter markets where loan sizes, interest rates, and down payments are negotiated bilaterally. The theory generates pass-through from nominal interest rates to real lending rates depending on market microstructure, policy, and firm characteristics. Higher banks' bargaining power, for example, raises pass-through but weakens transmission to investment. Interest rate spreads arise from liquidity, regulatory, and intermediation premia and depend on policy described as money growth or open market operations. (JEL E43, E52, G21, G31, G32, L26)

The empirical methodology used by Persson and Rossin-Slater (2018) to estimate the causal effect of in utero exposure to stress contains a potentially significant flaw. They define the control group in a way that may bias their causal estimates and can lead to the finding of a significant relationship when there is none. In this note, I describe the source of the bias and suggest an alternative specification of the control group. (JEL I12, J12, J13)

Policy uncertainty reduces individual welfare when individuals have limited opportunities to mitigate or insure against the resulting consumption fluctuations. We field an original survey to measure the degree of perceived policy uncertainty in Social Security benefits and to estimate the impact of this uncertainty on individual welfare. Our central estimates show that on average individuals are willing to forgo 6 percent of the benefits they are supposed to get under current law to remove the policy uncertainty associated with their future Social Security benefits. This translates to a risk premium from policy uncertainty equal to 10 percent of expected benefits.

Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high-quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes signals about a publicly observable future event, and may strategically misrepresent information to inflate the principal’s perception of his quality. We show that the optimal deterministic mechanism is simple and easy to implement in practice: it evaluates a single, optimally timed prediction. We study the generality of this result and its robustness to randomization and noncommitment. (JEL C53, D72, D82)

This paper studies the welfare effects of a “partial banking union” in which cross-country transfers for bailouts are set at the supranational level, but policymakers in member countries decide the distribution of funds. This allows the self-interested policymakers to extract rents in the bailout process. In equilibrium, such a banking union can actually lower the welfare of citizens in the country receiving transfers compared to the autarky case, as the receiving country must increase its share of the overall burden of the bailout, in order to compensate for the rent-seeking distortion. Supranational fiscal rules are ineffective at reversing this result. (JEL D72, E44, E61, G01, G21, G28)

Testing Efficient Risk Sharing with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences: Reply by Maurizio Mazzocco and Shiv Saini. Published in volume 108, issue 10, pages 3114-15 of American Economic Review, October 2018

In a comment, Okamoto (2018 ) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004 ). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding. (JEL D44)

The literature on belief-driven business cycles treats news and noise as distinct representations of agents' beliefs. We prove they are empirically the same. Our result lets us isolate the importance of purely belief-driven fluctuations. Using three prominent estimated models, we show that existing research understates the importance of pure beliefs. We also explain how differences in both economic environment and information structure affect the estimated importance of pure beliefs. (JEL D83, D84, E12, E23, E32)

Recent decades have witnessed a surge of trade in intermediate goods and a proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). FTAs use rules of origin (RoO) to distinguish goods originating from member countries from those originating from third countries. We focus on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the world’s largest FTA, and construct a unique dataset that allows us to map the input-output linkages in its RoO. Exploiting cross-product and cross-country variation in treatment over time, we show that NAFTA RoO led to a sizable reduction in imports of intermediate goods from third countries relative to NAFTA partners. (JEL F13, F15, F23, L14, O19)

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two.