Knowledge that Transforms

In Imperial Russia, incorporation required an expensive special concession, yet over 4,000 Russian firms incorporated before 1914. I identify the characteristics of incorporating firms and measure the productivity gains and growth in machine power enjoyed by corporations using newly-constructed factory-level panel data compiled from Russian factory censuses. Factories owned by corporations were larger, more productive, and more mechanized than unincorporated factories. Higher productivity factories were more likely to incorporate and, after incorporating, added machine power and became even more labor productive. Russian firms sought the corporate form’s full set of advantages, not just stock markets access, to obtain scarce long-term financing.

Mattauch et al. (2020) claims that the quantitative conclusions in Lemoine and Rudik (2017)—henceforth, LR17—are not robust to using a climate model consistent with recent scientific results. We observe that LR17 in fact analyzes an extension to a more realistic carbon model that generates an efficient emission tax trajectory very similar to that in Mattauch et al. (2020), and we here show that simplifications in the temperature model of LR17 do not qualitatively affect their policy conclusions. Accounting for inertia reduces the initial emission tax by 42 percent and reduces the present value of abatement cost by 39 percent.

In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.

Are business cycles mainly a response to persistent exogenous shocks, or do they instead reflect a strong endogenous mechanism which produces recurrent boom-bust phenomena? In this paper we present evidence in favor of the second interpretation and we highlight the set of key elements that influence our answer. The elements that tend to favor this type of interpretation of business cycles are (i) slightly extending the frequency window one associates with business cycle phenomena, (ii) allowing for strategic complementarities across agents that arise due to financial frictions, and (iii) allowing for a locally unstable steady state in estimation.

We estimate the magnitudes of reduced earnings, work hours, and wage rates of workers displaced during the Great Recession using linked employer-employee panel data from Washington state. Displaced workers’ earnings losses occurred mainly because hourly wage rates dropped at the time of displacement and recovered sluggishly. Lost employer-specific premiums explain only 17 percent of these losses. Fully 70 percent of displaced workers moved to employers paying the same or higher wage premiums than the displacing employers, but these workers nevertheless suffered substantial wage rate losses. Loss of valuable specific worker-employer matches explains more than one-half of the wage losses.

Studying job matching in a Kelso-Crawford framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire. We characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue functions that satisfy the substitutes condition), a critical condition on hospitals’ revenue functions for well-behaved competitive equilibria. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a “generalized interval constraint,” which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors, forces some hires, and forbids others. Additionally, “generalized polyhedral constraints” are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all “group separable” revenue functions.

A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm’s optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm’s payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.

We study housing markets with multiple segments searched by heterogeneous clienteles. In the San Francisco Bay Area, search activity and inventory covary negatively across cities, but positively across market segments within cities. A quantitative search model shows how the endogenous flow of broad searchers to high-inventory segments within their search ranges induces a positive relationship between inventory and search activity across segments with a large common clientele. The prevalence of broad searchers shapes the response of housing markets to localized supply and demand shocks. Broad searchers help spread shocks across many segments and reduce their effect on local market activity.

Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants.

This paper uses new confidential Census data to revisit the relationship between firm size, cyclicality, and financial frictions. First, we find that large firms (the top 1 percent by size) are less cyclically sensitive than the rest. Second, high and rising concentration implies that the higher cyclicality of the bottom 99 percent of firms only has a modest impact on aggregate fluctuations. Third, differences in cyclicality are not simply explained by financing, and in fact appear largely unrelated to proxies for financial strength. We instead provide evidence for an alternative mechanism based on the industry scope of the very largest firms.