Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate tax incidence reflected in the pricing of syndicated loans and argue that loan spread increases in bank income taxes of borrowers’ home states. We compare borrowers in states with differing bank tax rates and demonstrate the presence of tax incidence on borrowers with causality coming from bank taxes. Tax incidence on borrowers increases with local loan market concentration and pre-existing lending relationships. Further, a lack of tax deductibility of loan loss provisions enhances tax incidence. We conclude that bank income taxation, though specifically targeted at banks, is partially passed through to borrowers and increases their cost of debt.

We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing.

We study the impact of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) on mergers and acquisitions. DPAD reduces corporate tax rates on income from work or goods made in the U.S. Results indicate that the quantity and quality of acquisition bids by DPAD-advantaged firms conform to the predictions of the neoclassical theory of the firm and the theory of financial constraints. Specifically, bids, particularly those cash-financed, increase substantially in industries with large DPAD-related tax cuts and for firms with financial constraints. Moreover, DPAD improves acquisition quality where acquirers and targets are likely to generate incremental DPAD tax benefits through their merger.

Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014) find that investors use individual analyst forecasts as additional earnings benchmarks. We investigate whether executives manage earnings to beat these individual benchmarks. Using year-end effective tax rate (ETR) manipulation as our setting, we find that firms decrease ETRs from 3rd to 4th quarter to meet or beat a greater percentage of individual forecasts. We also find some evidence that firms use incremental ETR changes to meet forecasts by key analysts. After controlling for the distance to the nearest forecast, our evidence shows that firms are more likely to beat an incremental forecast with a decrease in ETR compared to missing an incremental forecast with an increase in ETR. Our study highlights the strategic nature of earnings management by providing evidence that managers consider individual forecasts to calibrate earnings management decisions.

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.

We examine how the qualitative characteristics of a non-GAAP earnings disclosure reveal the quality of the non-GAAP performance metric itself. We measure the qualitative aspects of the non-GAAP disclosure using an index of 12 hand-coded characteristics and presentation choices that provide context to non-GAAP disclosures. We find that more transparent qualitative information in non-GAAP disclosures is associated with more transitory non-GAAP exclusions and a lower likelihood that managers will aggressively exclude expenses in calculating non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We also find that the association between non-GAAP exclusions and earnings announcement period returns is less negative for firms with more transparent qualitative information accompanying their non-GAAP disclosures. Overall, these results suggest that qualitative characteristics of non-GAAP disclosures convey useful information about the quality of non-GAAP earnings metrics.

We examine whether the public availability of product market incumbents' financial disclosures leads to greater capital structure mimicking of incumbents by entrants. Exploiting a change in disclosure enforcement for German private firms in the mid-2000s, we find entrant-incumbent mimicking rises substantially in concentrated markets once incumbents' financial statements are publicly available. Additional tests exploring potential mechanisms are more consistent with interfirm learning underlying the effect than alternative channels. Our findings shed light on the effects of competitor financial statement disclosure on private firms’ initial financing decisions and highlight how capital structure dependencies among peer firms arise.

This paper analyzes the effects of expanded compensation disclosures on manager pay. For identification, I use the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in the 2007 proxy season, a significant expansion in required compensation disclosures, to compare manager pay at firms with and without the disclosure in a difference-in-differences analysis. These disclosures are associated with increasing pay, contrary to the conventional wisdom that pay disclosures reduce pay levels via better shareholder monitoring. I hypothesize that enhanced ex ante disclosures of incentive plans reduce boards’ flexibility to make ex post adjustments or to use subjectivity and pressure boards toward more formulaic plans. Both effects impose higher payout risk on managers, leading to increased pay levels. Consistent with this hypothesis, the CD&A introduction is associated with lower likelihood to earn variable cash pay, greater use of formula-based pay, and higher pay at firms with more volatile measures of performance.

We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is incremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenous shocks to competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive intensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. We document that CEO compensation contracts are used as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of upstream industries to a firm's benefit. Our findings are economically important as suppliers provide, on average, 45 percent of the value delivered by procuring firms to the market (BEA, 2016).

Executive bonus plans often incorporate performance measures that exclude particular costs—a practice we refer to as “cost shielding.” We predict that boards use cost shielding to mitigate underinvestment and insulate new managers from the costs of prior executives’ decisions. We find evidence that boards use cost shielding to deter underinvestment in intangibles and encourage managers to take advantage of growth opportunities. We also find that cost shielding tends to be elevated for newly-hired executives, and decreases over tenure. Collectively, our results suggest that boards deliberately choose performance metrics that alleviate agency conflicts.