Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years.

We document that leased capital constitutes about 30% of the total productive physical assets used by US public firms. We develop an analytical framework to demonstrate how the neglect of leases leads to an overestimation of productivity. This overestimation can be decomposed into two distinct channels: one arises from the mismeasured factor share, and the other from the omitted-leased-capital channel. Empirically, we find that the overestimation of aggregate productivity is substantial, has been increasing over time, and exhibits strong countercyclicality. In the cross-section, the decomposition of overestimation presents asymmetric patterns for firms of different sizes and levels of financial constraint. Our findings highlight the critical importance of explicitly accounting for the “unmeasured” leased capital in studies on productivity measurements.

We investigate stock tail risk around national elections worldwide over the period of 1982–2012. We find that firm stock is less likely to crash during the election years, and is more likely to crash during the post-election period. This inter-temporal pattern is consistent with the suppression of negative information when there is heightened political uncertainty around elections and with the subsequent release of adverse news when the uncertainty is reduced. Further analysis shows that the impact of political uncertainty on tail risk is stronger in countries with poorer investor protection, fewer electoral checks and balances, more uncertain election outcomes and pro-business incumbent governments, in industries which are more politically sensitive, and in firms with larger information asymmetry.

We examine the impact of an anti-corruption campaign on analyst earnings forecast optimism. Using hand-collected site visits data by the Central Inspection Team (CIT) in China that began in 2013, we document higher analyst optimism during CIT visit periods than during non-CIT visit periods. The results are robust to matched samples, placebo tests, alternative fixed effect and clustering specifications, endogeneity of CIT site visits concern, and alternative samples. Additional analysis suggests that local government pressure and firm bad-news-hiding explain the findings but it is not consistent with the improved firm fundamentals interpretation. Moreover, we find that the effect of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more pronounced for star, non-affiliated, and experienced analysts, supporting the notion that, because of their greater influence, local governments focus on pressuring these analysts. More important, the impact of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more salient if a CIT leader had previous work experience or longer work experience in the inspected province. Interestingly, we document a reversion in analyst earnings forecast optimism 60 days after CIT site visits, especially among the non-state-owned firms, suggesting that, after the CIT investigation, analyst optimism is no longer needed.

Using over 11,000 unlicensed loans to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore, we provide basic information about an understudied market: illegal moneylending. Borrowers and lenders interact frequently and rely primarily on relational contracts to enforce their agreements. Borrowers have high discount rates, often have gambling and/or substance abuse problems, and often repay late. While lenders sometimes resort to nonfinancial punishments, the primary cost of late repayment is the compounding of a very high interest rate. Consistent with our view that lenders cannot extract all surplus, a crackdown on illegal lending raised interest rates and lowered the size of loans.

Individualism has long been linked to economic growth. Using the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that such a culture can hamper the economy's response to crises, a period with heightened coordination frictions. Exploiting variation in U.S. counties' frontier experience, we show that more individualistic counties engage less in social distancing and charitable transfers and are less willing to receive COVID-19 vaccines. The effect of individualism is stronger where social distancing has higher externality and holds at the individual level when we exploit migrants for identification. Our results suggest that individualism can exacerbate collective action problems during economic downturns.

International transactions are costly because they require investments in logistics, contracts, and the acquisition of local institutional knowledge. We posit that a portion of the fixed cost of entering a specific export market can be used toward covering the cost of acquiring imported inputs from that same market, and vice versa. Using dis-aggregated transactions data for Chinese firms from 2000 to 2015, we document firm-level trading patterns suggesting such bilateral economies of scope. Through a structural model, we estimate that the simultaneous export and import in a given country reduce export and import fixed costs by around 42 and 35 percent, respectively.