Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles? by Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 412-17 of American Economic Review, May 2009

When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation, whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

We use a new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze how consumers responded to the 2001 federal income tax rebates. We estimate the monthly response of credit card payments, spending, and debt, exploiting the unique, randomized timing of the rebate disbursement. We find that, on average, consumers initially saved some of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby paying down debt. But soon afterward their spending increased, counter to the permanent income model. Spending rose most for consumers who were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained, whereas debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained consumers.

Gender gap can arise due to various factors—socio-economic, culture, risk attitudes, and macro-economic circumstances. Using a unique dataset that merges motor vehicle events with bankruptcy outcomes and personal data from Singapore, this study finds significant evidence of a gender gap in personal bankruptcy risk. We show that women’s odds of being involved in bankruptcy events are 28% of those of men after controlling for demographic variables, housing type, cultural and spatial fixed effects. Using motor vehicle accidents as an instrument, we confirm that the gender gap in bankruptcy risk is mainly driven by risk-taking behavior. The heterogeneity analyses show that culture also explains part of the difference. Chinese, Indian, and Malay women have differential bankruptcy rates in Singapore.

Learning to Cope: Voluntary Financial Education and Loan Performance during a Housing Crisis by Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet and Douglas D. Evanoff. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 495-500 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Using establishment-level data, we examine the impact of the Indian government’s employment guarantee program on labor and firm behavior. We exploit the staggered implementation of the program for identification and find that the program led to a 10% reduction in the permanent workforce in firms. Firms responded to the adverse labor-supply shock by resorting to increased mechanization. This significantly increased the firms’ cost of production, leading to a decline in net profits and productivity. These effects manifested primarily in firms paying low wages, firms having low labor productivity and greater sales volatility, and firms located in states with pro-employer labor regulations.

Using a novel scanner data and difference-in-differences strategy, we assess how consumers respond to a large-scale tax reform in India that introduces exogenous variations in tax rate changes at the product level. We show evidence of a strong and persistent spending response to tax rate changes. The response is highly asymmetrical, with consumers responding significantly more strongly to tax rate increases than to decreases. We find empirical support for both intertemporal and cross-product substitution effects: Households (1) shift consumption forward preceding a tax increase and (2) substitute one good for another and alter their relative weight in the consumption basket to avoid paying higher tax. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that consumers with more personal shopping experience exhibit stronger consumption responses. Our findings have empirical implications for the efficacy of tax policy initiatives.

Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.

This paper adopts a novel approach to examine the roles of gender difference and intra-household economic power in mortgage signing order. We develop an “economic power” index based on relative economic power within the same-sex couple households. We then use this measure along with gender identity and other factors to explain signing order in different-gender couples. Our results suggest that, while pure economic power explains much of the observed signing order, gender difference plays an important role. Analysis exploiting regional variation reveals that gender difference in signing order is greater in states with a larger gender wage gap and red states whose residents predominantly vote for the Republican.

The U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee considered many important banking reforms in 2009 to 2010. We show that, during this period, foreclosure starts on delinquent mortgages were delayed in the districts of committee members although there was no difference in delinquency rates between committee and noncommittee districts. In these areas, banks delayed the foreclosure starts by 0.5 months (relative to the 12‐month average). The estimated cost of delay to lenders is an order of magnitude greater than the campaign contributions by the political action committees of the largest mortgage servicing banks to the committee members in that period.