After China’s recent great success in eliminating absolute poverty, addressing relative income inequality becomes a more important issue. This survey finds that income inequality rapidly increased in the first three decades since 1978 but stabilized and slightly declined in the past decade, consistent with the well-known Kuznets hypothesis. In addition to documenting the trend and patterns over time and across groups and regions, seven sources of income inequality are systematically discussed with an effort to reconcile and extend the existing literature. Furthermore, a negative correlation is documented between income inequality and intergenerational mobility, consistent with the Great Gatsby curve observed in developed countries.

Bequest to and marriage of children can lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation. The inefficiency (or market failure) arises because one family, making a bequest to its own child, ignores the contribution to the utility of the other family whose child enters the marriage. This note shows that an assortative mating rule based on bequests can improve or even restore Pareto efficiency when parents take account of the rule in deciding the amount of bequests to their own children.

Becker attributes the existence of marital transfers to inflexibility in the division of joint product within the marriage. If that were the only reason, we would not have observed the coexistence of dowries and bride‐prices. This paper offers an alternative analysis. While Becker's interpretation is retained for bride‐prices, a dowry is now represented as a premortem bequest by altruistic parents for a daughter. It not only increases the wealth of the new conjugal household but also enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the allocation of the output within the household, thereby safeguarding here welfare. Using micro data from Taiwan, we found that a dowry improves the bride's welfare whereas a bride‐price has no effect. These empirical results support the theoretical predictions of the model.

This paper is based on the idea that for each partner in a marriage, there are two distinct types of leisure. One type is each person’s independent (or private) leisure, and the other type is spousal leisure, whose importance has long been emphasized in the literature of psychology. While each type of leisure is unobservable (only total leisure is observed), it is shown that the recent collective models of the intrahousehold allocation initiated by Chiappori can be extended to identify each type of leisure up to an additive constant. In particular, the effects of each member’s wage, household unearned income, and extrahousehold environmental parameters on the independent and spousal leisure and on the sharing rule are fully identified. The observational requirement here is the same as in other studies, namely, the observation of individual labor supply, individual wages, household unearned income, one assignable good, and consumption expenditure at the household level.

This paper examines the impact of the birth rate on economic growth by using a panel data set of 28 provinces in China over twenty years. Because China's one-child policy applied only to the Han Chinese but not to minorities, this unique affirmative policy allows us to use the proportion of minorities in a province as an instrumental variable to identify the causal effect of the birth rate on economic growth. We find that the birth rate has a negative impact on economic growth. The finding not only supports the view of Malthus, but also suggests that China's birth control policy is indeed growth enhancing.

This study investigates the effects of unobserved earnings-related endowments on marital outcomes, focusing on potential gender differences. Using a less stringent, more plausible assumption that monozygotic twins share more similar endowments relative to dizygotic twins, we develop a novel identification strategy from the twins experiment. Using unique Chinese twins survey data, we find that men with genetic endowments related to higher earnings marry earlier and have younger, taller wives; such women marry later and have older husbands with higher education and income. Results cast doubt on the conventional assumption of independence between unobservables and observable marital attributes.

Since the introduction of the one-child policy in China in 1979, many more boys than girls have been born, foreshadowing a sizable bride shortage. What do young men unable to find wives do? This paper focuses on criminality, an asocial activity that has seen a marked rise since the mid-1990s. Exploiting province-year level variation, we find an elasticity of crime with respect to the sex ratio of 16- to 25-year-olds of 3.4, suggesting that male sex ratios can account for one-seventh of the rise in crime. We hypothesize that adverse marriage market conditions drive this association.

We use survey data on twins in urban China, among whom many experienced the consequences of the forced mass rustication movement of the Cultural Revolution, to identify the roles of altruism, favoritism, and guilt in affecting family behavior. We exploit the fact that many families were forced to select one of their adolescent children to be sent down. We show the conditions under which guilt, favoritism, and altruism can be identified using such data. We find that parents behaved altruistically, showed favoritism, but also exhibited guilt: the child experiencing more rustication years received higher parental transfers despite having higher earnings.

We develop a generalized theory of rationed fertility to analyze treatment effect heterogeneity in the child quantity-quality trade-off. An exogenous increase in fertility can be either desired or undesired. We derive a positive rationing income effect on child quality for desired fertility increases but a negative rationing income effect for undesired fertility increases. We propose an econometric framework to identify treatment effects of desired and undesired fertility increases and estimate a structural model to gauge the quantitative importance of the novel rationing income effect. Our study highlights the importance of distinguishing between desired and undesired changes when evaluating social programs.