In Discrimination and Disparities, Thomas Sowell describes how economists think about the causes of disparities in socioeconomic outcomes. He cautions against government intervention to reduce disparities, noting that such interventions often have unintended consequences. In this review, I discuss the role of economic theory and empirical evidence in helping move society toward more equitable outcomes. I find far more reason to be hopeful about the role of government than Sowell does, but also argue for more experimentation and rigorous evaluation to be sure that our well-intentioned policies have their intended impacts.

We simulate the impact on the nonbank liabilities of banks in a multiplex interbank environment arising from changes in currency exposure. Currency shocks as a source of financial contagion in the banking sector have not, so far, been considered. Our model considers two sources of contagion: shocks to nonbank assets and exchange rate shocks. Interbank loans can mature at different times. We demonstrate that a dominant currency can be a significant source of financial contagion. We also find evidence of asymmetries in losses stemming from large currency depreciations versus appreciations. A variety of scenarios are considered allowing for differences in the sparsity of the banking network, the relative size and number of banks, changes in nonbank assets and equity, the possibility of bank breakups, and the dominance of a particular currency. Policy implications are also drawn.

We study the impact of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) on mergers and acquisitions. DPAD reduces corporate tax rates on income from work or goods made in the U.S. Results indicate that the quantity and quality of acquisition bids by DPAD-advantaged firms conform to the predictions of the neoclassical theory of the firm and the theory of financial constraints. Specifically, bids, particularly those cash-financed, increase substantially in industries with large DPAD-related tax cuts and for firms with financial constraints. Moreover, DPAD improves acquisition quality where acquirers and targets are likely to generate incremental DPAD tax benefits through their merger.

We analyze the effects on financial stability of the interplay between climate transition risk and market conditions, such as recovery rate and asset price volatility. To this end, we extend the framework of the climate stress-test of the financial system by including an ex-ante network valuation of financial assets which accounts for asset price volatility as well as for endogenous recovery rate on interbank assets. Moreover, we also consider the dynamics of indirect contagion of banks and investment funds, which are key players in the low carbon transition, via exposures to the same asset classes. We derive some analytical results and we apply the model to a unique supervisory dataset in a range of climate policy scenarios and market conditions. In the event of a disorderly low-carbon transition, stronger market conditions allow to reach more ambitious climate policies at the same level of financial risk.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that a male favoring pay gap exists in every one of its member countries. To reduce the gender pay gap, governments and investors are demanding that companies disclose gender pay information. While companies seem to resist these demands, there is little evidence about how investors might react to the disclosure of gender pay information. We draw on theories of fairness and the instrumental perspective of corporate social responsibility activities to predict how the disclosure of gender pay information influences investor judgments. Our experimental findings indicate investors are more willing to invest in a company that discloses gender pay equity compared to either a company disclosing a gender pay gap or one disclosing no gender pay information. Further, our mediation analyses results show a sequential mediation process whereby the gender pay disclosure affects perceptions of fairness (economic consequences) directly (indirectly through fairness), with only perceptions of the economic consequences resulting from the gender pay disclosure directly influencing willingness to invest. In addition, despite the presence of the same sequential mediation relationship, we find limited evidence investors are less willing to invest in a company that discloses a typical gender pay gap compared to a company disclosing no gender pay information. Two additional experiments indicate it is the information about gender pay, not its disclosure by the company, that influences investors; and the effect is intentional. Our results are consistent with investors anticipating real economic consequences from the disclosure of gender pay information.

Variance risk premia (VRP) based on equity and credit market information for the same firm differ substantially in magnitude. VRP is strongly dependent on firm characteristics. Higher-leveraged and larger firms have lower VRP. The smirk in the plot of VRP vs. leverage is higher for low-levered firms than for high-levered firms. This smirk is more pronounced in the credit market than in the equity market. VRP, and especially credit VRP, correlates with higher future returns and is a priced source of risk in both markets.

We compare CRSP dividend data to data from firms' financial statements in the SEC's EDGAR database. Data screens typically used in the extant literature produce a sample in which about half of the apparent reductions in dividends per share are not actually dividend cuts. Many of the fictitious cuts are due to CRSP misclassifying special dividends as regular dividends. We demonstrate that the fictitious cuts can affect point estimates and inferences in studies of the information content of dividends. We provide a simple filter that eliminates most of the fictitious cuts in our sample – remove dividend cuts from the sample that are preceded by a dividend increase in the prior quarter. This filter produces empirical results that are similar to our sample of true cuts.

We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is incremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenous shocks to competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive intensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. We document that CEO compensation contracts are used as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of upstream industries to a firm's benefit. Our findings are economically important as suppliers provide, on average, 45 percent of the value delivered by procuring firms to the market (BEA, 2016).

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.

Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014) find that investors use individual analyst forecasts as additional earnings benchmarks. We investigate whether executives manage earnings to beat these individual benchmarks. Using year-end effective tax rate (ETR) manipulation as our setting, we find that firms decrease ETRs from 3rd to 4th quarter to meet or beat a greater percentage of individual forecasts. We also find some evidence that firms use incremental ETR changes to meet forecasts by key analysts. After controlling for the distance to the nearest forecast, our evidence shows that firms are more likely to beat an incremental forecast with a decrease in ETR compared to missing an incremental forecast with an increase in ETR. Our study highlights the strategic nature of earnings management by providing evidence that managers consider individual forecasts to calibrate earnings management decisions.