We use a vignette-based survey experiment to elicit respondents’ assessments of the fairness of race-based hiring decisions and compare these assessments with the predictions of four preregistered ethical frameworks. While conservative respondents are much more accepting of discriminatory actions than others, respondents of all political leanings rate the relative fairness of different actions in a very similar way. A two-group framework in which one group (mostly self-described conservatives) values employers’ decision rights, the other has utilitarian concerns, and both groups use the same race-blind rules to assign relative fairness levels to actions explains our data well.

Competitive threats motivate firms to use convertible debt because the possibility of future conversion enhances financial flexibility. Consistent with this intuition, we find that the intensity of competitive threats is positively associated with convertible debt financing at both the extensive and intensive margins. By using large tariff reductions as exogenous shocks to competition we show that this relation is likely causal. Convertible debt usage in response to competitive threats strongly depends on a firm’s relative financial and competitive conditions. In addition, firms increase the probability of future conversion by tailoring convertible debt features.

Drawing on current literature, this study develops a simple external financing model and provides international evidence of the causal effects of corporate governance improvements on trade credit. We introduce an internal governance perspective, hypothesizing that weak internal governance, which fosters managerial agency problems, allows firm managers to misuse trade credit. Specifically, poor governance may lead firms to rely on supplier financing as a substitute for traditional financing when they face financing constraints, a practice the literature argues raises concerns about shifting a firm's financial burdens onto its suppliers. Using a decade of data surrounding governance-enhancing board reforms in 38 countries, our difference-indifferences analyses strongly support these predictions. We find that strengthening board oversight via exogenous reforms reduces firms' reliance on supplier financing. Improved internal governance decreases firms' dependence on supplier financing and limits the manipulation of payables through real earnings management activities, such as inventory overproduction, which affects accounts payable. We also find that the effect of internal governance reforms is most pronounced in countries with stronger external governance mechanisms, suggesting a complementary effect. Additionally, our findings show that enhanced governance leads to better investment decisions and improved firm performance, especially for financially constrained firms and those with high agency costs.

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.

We examine the impact of the SEC’s Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI) on the role of employee gender in the Division of Corporation Finance’s filing review process. Gender bias theory suggests that women may work harder to compensate for perceived bias and discrimination. Consistent with this theory, we find that women reviewers issue longer comment letters, raise more issues, ask more accounting-specific questions, reference more authoritative guidance, request more filing amendments, follow up on more issues from prior rounds, and take longer to close the comment letter process. We also find that women are less prevalent in higher paygrades and leadership positions. These gender differences attenuate after the establishment of OMWI in 2011, but significant differences remain. Analyses of SEC employee survey data corroborate our comment letter results. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.