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Risk Premia and Preemption in R&D Ventures

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2004 39(4), 843-872
I analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closed form for the case of a two-stage race in continuous time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead. Compared to the case where firms collude, R&D competition erodes the option value to mothball a project, reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D, and causes higher and more volatile risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry.

Corporate Innovation and Returns

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2019 9(2), 340-383
Among U.S. public firms, technological innovation is concentrated on a small set of large players, with innovation “leaders” having considerably lower systematic risk than “laggards.” To understand this fact, we build a winner-takes-all patent race model and show that a firm’s expected return decreases in its innovation output and increases in that of its rivals. Using a comprehensive firm-level panel of information on patenting activity by fields of technology in 1950–2010, we find strong support for the model’s predictions. Our results highlight that strategic interactions among firms competing in innovation are an important determinant of risk and expected returns. (JEL G12, G31) Received August 6, 2018; editorial decision October 19, 2019 by Andrew Ellul.

Heterogeneous Innovation, Firm Creation and Destruction, and Asset Prices

The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2016 6(1), 46-87
We study the implications of creative destruction on asset prices. We develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous firm creation and destruction in which “incremental” innovation by incumbents and “radical” innovation by entrants drive productivity improvements. Firms’ incentives to innovate generate time-varying economic growth and countercyclical economic uncertainty. The model matches key properties of consumption and asset prices, as well as novel facts on the process of creative destruction in the United States obtained using a sample of patents from 1975–2013. We show that the interplay between incumbents and entrants is an important determinant of risks priced in the financial markets.

Ambiguity and the corporation: Group disagreement and underinvestment

Journal of Financial Economics 2017 125(3), 417-433
We study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a “utilitarian” governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision. In this setting we show that: (i) group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent, (ii) dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment, and (iii) the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may, in some cases, lead to inefficient overinvestment. Our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups, such as corporate boards, on firms’ outcomes and, more generally, on the difference between group and individual behavior.

Group-Managed Real Options

Review of Financial Studies 2022 35(9), 4105-4151
We study a standard real-option problem in which sequential decisions are made through voting by a group of members with heterogeneous beliefs. We show that, when facing both investment and abandonment timing decisions, the group behavior cannot be replicated by that of a representative “median” member. As a result, members’ disagreement generates inertia—the group delays investment relative to a single-agent case—and underinvestment—the group rejects projects that are supported by a majority of members, acting in autarky. These coordination frictions hold in groups of any size, for general voting protocols, and are exacerbated by belief polarization.

Investment Shocks and Asset Prices: An Investment-Based Approach

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2020 55(8), 2665-2699
We propose a new approach, based on investment data, to determine firms’ return exposure to investment-specific technology (IST) shocks. When applied to U.S. data, we find that, in contrast to the pattern estimated from empirical IST proxies, value firms have higher exposure to IST shocks than growth firms. When applied to simulated data from existing theoretical models, our approach reveals that existing empirical findings may result from measurement errors in the IST proxies. Importantly, our simulation analysis uncovers the key role played by investment data in determining the economic mechanism through which IST shocks affect cross-sectional asset prices.

Capital utilization, market power, and the pricing of investment shocks

Journal of Financial Economics 2017 126(3), 447-470
Capital utilization and market power crucially affect asset prices in an economy exposed to shocks that improve real investment opportunities through capital-embodied technological innovations. We embed these two mechanisms in a standard general equilibrium model and show that (i) the price of risk for investment shocks is negative under fixed capital utilization, but positive under sufficiently flexible capital utilization, and (ii) the equity return exposure to investment shocks is negative under perfect competition, but positive under high market power. We further show that, high market power, persistent components in technology growth, and a strong preference for early resolution of uncertainty are jointly important to quantitatively match the observed equity risk premium.

Solving Consumption and Portfolio Choice Problems: The State Variable Decomposition Method

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(9), 3346-3400
We develop a new solution method for a broad class of discrete-time dynamic portfolio choice problems. The method efficiently approximates conditional expectations of the value function by using (i) a decomposition of the state variables into a component observable by the investor and a stochastic deviation; and (ii) a Taylor expansion of the value function. We illustrate the accuracy of the method in handling several realistic features of portfolio choice problems such as intermediate consumption, multiple assets, multiple state variables, portfolio constraints, non-time-separable preferences, and nonredundant endogenous state variables. We finally use the method to solve a realistic large-scale life-cycle portfolio choice and consumption problem with predictable expected returns and recursive preferences.

Financial Distress and the Cross‐section of Equity Returns

Journal of Finance 2011 66(3), 789-822
We explicitly consider financial leverage in a simple equity valuation model and study the cross‐sectional implications of potential shareholder recovery upon resolution of financial distress. Our model is capable of simultaneously explaining lower returns for financially distressed stocks, stronger book‐to‐market effects for firms with high default likelihood, and the concentration of momentum profits among low credit quality firms. The model further predicts (i) a hump‐shaped relationship between value premium and default probability, and (ii) stronger momentum profits for nearly distressed firms with significant prospects for shareholder recovery. Our empirical analysis strongly confirms these novel predictions.