We assess empirically the effects of the winner's curse which, in common-value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders' preferences have both common- and private-value components, and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model. Second, we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the State of New Jersey. For a large subset of these auctions, we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies. In this setting, then, asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable.

We consider the identification of counterfactual distributions and treatment effects when the outcome variables and conditioning covariates are observed in separate datasets. Under the standard selection on observables assumption, the counterfactual distributions and treatment effect parameters are no longer point identified. However, applying the classical monotone re-arrangement inequality, we derive sharp bounds on the counterfactual distributions and policy parameters of interest.

We present evidence consistent with time-varying risk preferences among automobile drivers. Exploiting a unique data set of agents' high-frequency driving behavior collected by a mobile phone application, we show that drivers drive more conservatively following near-miss accidents. In a preferred specification, a near-miss triggers a reduction in driving distance of 12.98 kilometers, in-car cell phone use by more than 100%, and highway use by 43.24%. Structural estimation results indicate that such changes in behavior are consistent with an increase in risk aversion of 10.54% to 43.77% and a reduction in annual insurance cost amounting to 2.04% to 3.31% of the average car insurance premium.

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.

To investigate whether secondary markets aid or harm durable goods manufacturers, we build a dynamic model of durable goods oligopoly with transaction costs in the secondary market. Calibrating model parameters using data from the US automobile industry, we find the net effect of opening the secondary market is to decrease new car manufacturers' profits by 35 percent. Counterfactual scenarios in which the size of the used good stock decreases, such as when products become less durable, when the number of firms decreases, or when firms can commit to future production levels, increase the profitability of opening the secondary market.

This paper considers the measurement of consumer loss aversion in product markets. We introduce a test based on a “substitution effect,” focusing on how the end of a sale affects sales not of the good itself, but a substitute good. Such an effect cannot be easily confounded with consumer stockpiling. Using a unique dataset from an online hardware retailer, we find evidence consistent with consumer loss aversion. Moreover, we find that less experienced consumers suffer a more prominent loss aversion bias compared to more experienced consumers.

This paper proposes a new semi‐parametric identification and estimation approach to multinomial choice models in a panel data setting with individual fixed effects. Our approach is based on cyclic monotonicity, which is a defining convex‐analytic feature of the random utility framework underlying multinomial choice models. From the cyclic monotonicity property, we derive identifying inequalities without requiring any shape restrictions for the distribution of the random utility shocks. These inequalities point identify model parameters under straightforward assumptions on the covariates. We propose a consistent estimator based on these inequalities.

We quantify the effect of deliberation on the decisions of US appellate courts. We estimate a model in which strategic judges communicate before casting their votes and then compare the probability of mistakes in the court with deliberation with a counterfactual of no communication. The model has multiple equilibria, and preferences and information parameters are only partially identified. We find that there is a range of parameters in the identified set—when judges tend to disagree ex ante or their private information is imprecise—in which deliberation can be beneficial; otherwise, deliberation reduces the effectiveness of the court.

We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the MPI for these violations is small. The MPI indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected.