Abstract We document that firms with greater product similarity to their peers exhibit lower rates of financial fraud. We show that peer similarity is associated with better information environments, which is consistent with monitors’ enhanced ability to benchmark against other firms. The negative relation between product similarity and fraud remains after controlling for alternative mechanisms including incentive compensation structures, competition, and internal and external governance characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that greater peer similarity increases the marginal cost of fraud, and therefore, ex ante disincentivizing managers from committing fraud.

ABSTRACT We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.