We show that mortgage recourse systems, by discouraging default, magnify the impact of nominal rigidities. They cause deeper and more persistent recessions. This mechanism can account for up to 31% of the recovery gap during the Great Recession between the U.S., mostly a non-recourse economy, and Spain, a recourse economy. General equilibrium effects explain most of the differences between mortgage systems. With recourse, highly indebted homeowners dramatically cut consumption in a crisis, and account for a larger share of the aggregate consumption decline. However, without recourse, mortgages would be more expensive for riskier households, and homeownership rates would be lower.

We analyze the removal of the credit-risk guarantees provided by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in a model with agents heterogeneous in income and house price risk. We find that wealth inequality increases, driven by higher mortgage spreads and housing rents. Housing holdings become more concentrated. Foreclosures fall. The removal benefits high-income households, while hurting low- and mid-income households (renters and highly leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans). GSE reform requires compensating transfers, sufficiently high elasticity of rental supply, or linking GSE reform with the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. Received March 11, 2016; editorial decision May 5, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

This paper analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking in a model with fire sales externalities. When these externalities are not internalized by a bank's shareholders and executives, borrowing and fire sales are higher than the socially optimal level. Our analysis shows that plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities. Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits can restore social efficiency. Bail-in bonds can achieve efficiency at a smaller cost since they allow for state-contingent payments. It is not the level but the composition of variable compensation that determines the inefficiency. Excessive regulation may lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking. Government guarantees reinforce the fire sales externalities and the need for regulation.