Many classes of microstructure models, as well as intuition, suggest that it should be easier to trade when markets are more active. In the data, however, volume and liquidity seem unrelated over time. This paper offers an explanation for this fact based on a simple frictionless model in which liquidity reflects the average risk-bearing capacity of the economy and volume reflects the changing contribution of individuals to that average. Volume and liquidity are unrelated in the model, but volume is positively related to the variance of liquidity, or liquidity risk. Empirical evidence from the U.S. government bond and stock markets supports this new prediction.

This paper re-evaluates evidence in Ayers and Freeman [Ayers, F., Freeman, R., 1997. Market assessment of industry and firm earnings information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 205–218] suggesting that investors anticipate industry-wide components of earnings earlier than firm-specific components, and that post-earnings-announcement drift following annual earnings announcements is due primarily to firm-specific components of earnings. Our tests indicate that post-announcement drift is entirely attributable to coefficient bias due to measurement errors in the use of realized earnings changes as proxies for unexpected earnings. Also, coefficient differences in the market's anticipation of subsequent-year industry and firm-specific earnings become insignificant when we introduce suitable controls for non-linearity in the return/earnings relation.

DuPont analysis, a common form of financial statement analysis, decomposes return on net operating assets into two multiplicative components: profit margin and asset turnover. These two accounting ratios measure different constructs and, accordingly, have different properties. Prior research has found that a change in asset turnover is positively related to future changes in earnings. This paper comprehensively explores the DuPont components and contributes to the literature along three dimensions. First, the paper contributes to the financial statement analysis literature and finds that the information in this accounting signal is in fact incremental to accounting signals studied in prior research in predicting future earnings. Second, it contributes to the literature on the stock market's use of accounting information by examining immediate and future equity return responses to these components by investors. Finally, it adds to the literature on analysts' processing of accounting information by again testing immediate and delayed response of analysts through contemporaneous forecast revisions as well as future forecast errors. Consistent across both groups of market participants, the results show that the information is useful as evidenced by associations between the DuPont components and stock returns as well as analyst forecast revisions. However, I find predictable future forecast errors and future abnormal returns indicating that the information processing does not appear to be complete. Taken together, the analysis indicates that the DuPont components represent an incremental and viable form of information about the operating characteristics of a firm.

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.

Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data. , Oxford University Press.

Restructuring electricity markets has enabled wholesalers to exercise market power. Using a common method to measure competition, several studies have found substantial inefficiencies. This method overstates actual welfare loss by ignoring production constraints that result in non-convex costs. I develop an alternative method that accounts for these constraints and apply it to the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland market. For the summer following restructuring, the common method implies that market imperfections resulted in considerable welfare loss, with actual production costs exceeding the competitive model's estimates by 13%–21%. In contrast, my method finds that actual costs were only between 3% and 8% above the competitive levels.

Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms. Our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium-size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources, including leasing, supplier, development, and informal finance. Small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, mainly due to its effect on bank finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms, so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms. We also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries.

We examine “just vote no” campaigns, a recent innovation in low-cost shareholder activist tools whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a director's election to express dissatisfaction with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. Grundfest [1993. Just vote no: a minimalist strategy for dealing with barbarians inside the gates. Stanford Law Review 45, 857–937] argues that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to take immediate action to avoid further embarrassment. We find a variety of supportive evidence, including operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns induce boards to take actions in shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, abnormal turnover is robust to controlling for concurrent events and firm- and CEO-specific controls.

This paper finds that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned enterprises controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors). In regions with less developed institutions, SOEs controlled by central government (central SOEs) also have such a tendency. However, the tendency of local and central SOEs to hire small local auditors is attenuated as the institutions develop. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for large or non-local auditors, small local auditors’ superior local knowledge, and SOEs’ collusion incentives.