Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.

Despite the evidence that full funding of defined benefit pension obligations is value maximizing, managerial price and volatility sensitivities (deltas and vegas) do not appear to influence funded status for all except the CFOs of plan sponsors with weak credit ratings (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Whether realized total compensation (as opposed to changes in the value of securities held) encourages full funding is an open question. Here we examine the empirical relation between realized managerial compensation and the extent to which plan liabilities are funded, and find that CEO pay bears a significant relation with funded status.

We propose a novel approach to measuring firm-level risk exposures and costs of equity. Using a simple consumption-based asset pricing model that explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in average returns across 55 anomaly portfolios, we map the relation between exposures to consumption risk and portfolio-level characteristics. We use this relation to calculate exposures to consumption risk at the firm level and show that the calculated consumption risk exposures yield portfolios with large differences in average returns and ex post consumption risk exposures consistent with those predicted by our calculated betas. Further, industry betas and risk premia implied by our procedure display economically intuitive variation over time. Finally, Fama-MacBeth regressions suggest that risk exposures calculated using our procedure dominate those from alternative factor models at explaining cross-sectional variation in returns.

We document that borrowing costs and credit ratings are less sensitive to off-balance sheet lease financing than to on-balance sheet debt financing, particularly for firms that are financially constrained and firms that have limited ability to use tax shields. This evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions based on tax benefits as well as bankruptcy costs. Our evidence on borrowing costs and credit ratings suggests that credit markets treat operating leases differently from balance sheet debt. Consistent with this interpretation, we document that firms closer to ratings borderlines lease more, particularly around the investment grade borderline.

Using unique data on Canadian households, we show that financial advisors exert substantial influence over their clients' asset allocation, but provide limited customization. Advisor fixed effects explain considerably more variation in portfolio risk and home bias than a broad set of investor attributes that includes risk tolerance, age, investment horizon, and financial sophistication. Advisor effects remain important even when controlling flexibly for unobserved heterogeneity through investor fixed effects. An advisor's own asset allocation strongly predicts the allocations chosen on clients' behalf. This one‐size‐fits‐all advice does not come cheap: advised portfolios cost 2.5% per year, or 1.5% more than life cycle funds.

We study the consequences of a US deregulation allowing small firms to accelerate their public equity issuance. Post-deregulation, affected firms double their reliance on public equity and transition away from private investments in public equity compared to similar untreated firms. The net effect is a 5.7 percentage point or 49% increase in the annual probability of raising equity. This is accompanied by a reduction in equity issuance costs, an increase in investment, and a decrease in leverage. Our findings provide evidence that reducing equity issuance barriers benefits issuers even in highly developed markets.

Firms move between growth and value because of changes in either size or book value of equity. The value premium is specific to variation in book-to-market that emanates from size changes. A factor based on this variation earns the entire value premium; one based on the remaining variation earns no premium. Hence, not all high book-to-market firms earn the value premium, and some low book-to-market firms earn value-like returns. Many models price portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. None distinguish firms that earn the value premium from those that have a high book-to-market but do not earn the premium. Received July 22, 2015; editorial decision June 29, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.