There is debate in the literature focuses on whether open market repurchases can be taken as a signal of stock undervaluation. This research argues that takeover pressures before a repurchase announcement can be a credible signal of undervaluation. The empirical results indicate that repurchasing firms with a higher probability of takeover experience greater announcement effects, improvements in operating performance and long-run abnormal return, positive forecast revisions by financial analysts, and enhanced agreement between management and shareholders. These findings suggest that takeover probability and open-market share repurchases appear to constitute a double-signal for conveying stock undervaluation to the market.

We find that daily air pollution levels have a significant effect on the decision to purchase or cancel health insurance in a manner inconsistent with rational choice theory. A one standard deviation increase in daily air pollution leads to a 7.2% increase in the number of insurance contracts sold that day. Conditional on purchase, a one standard deviation decrease in air pollution during the cooling-off (i.e. cost-free cancellation) period relative to the order-date level increases the return probability by 4.0%. We explore a range of potential mechanism and find the most support for projection bias and salience.

This study considers the experience of china's one-child policy to examine how fertility restrictions affect economic and social outcomes over a lifetime. Using variations in these penalties across provinces and over time, we find that exposure to stricter fertility restrictions when young leads to higher education levels, more white-collar jobs, delayed marriage, and lower fertility rates. Further consequences include lower rates of residing with the elderly and higher household income, consumption, and savings. Finally, exposure to stricter fertility restrictions in early life increases female empowerment. Overall, fertility restrictions imposed when people are young have powerful effects throughout their life cycle.

We examine how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects pre-repurchase earnings management and its association with post-repurchase firm performance. Unlike prior pre-SOX studies, our post-SOX results indicate that open-market repurchasers do not engage in pre-buyback downward accrual-based earnings management. Audit committee independence, reforms in corporate governance structures, and changes in executives’ equity holdings prompted by SOX may explain the findings. Post-SOX, the significant negative association between pre-repurchase abnormal accruals and post-repurchase performance disappears, the market reaction to repurchase announcements becomes significantly less favorable, and there is no evidence of any shift away from accrual-based to real earnings management.

We study a transitional economy where state-controlled banks make loan decisions based on noisy inside information on prospective borrowers, and may lend to avert unemployment and social instability. In China, poor financial performance and high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Negative event study responses occur at bank loan announcements, particularly for borrowers measuring poorly on quality and creditworthiness, or for lenders or borrowers involved in litigation regarding loans. Our results highlight dilemmas in a state-led financial system and the local stock market’s sophistication in interpreting news.

We investigate the changes in risk sensitivities of interest rates following a shift in Prosper.com's pricing mechanism from auctions to posted prices. We find that the shift leads to reduced sensitivities of loan pricing to credit risk. Furthermore, this change results in higher profits for the platform while investors receive less compensation for the credit risk they undertake. Additionally, borrowers encounter less credit rationing. Analyses of repeat borrowers under both pricing regimes and tests with data under Prosper's upgraded posted prices confirm these findings. We argue that less risk-based pricing results from the incentives of the lending platform.

Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007–2009 financial crisis,banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banksin advance of a crisis,making them more vulnerable to the shock of the crisis.During crisis years, they generally experienced more increases in loan defaults, greater drops in operating and stock return performance, greater increases in expected default probability, and higher likelihood of CEO turnover or failure than other banks.CEO overconfidence thus canexplain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among banks.

Recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions that boards are self-interested in setting director compensation have focused scrutiny on the pay-setting process used by corporations. We examine the effect of peer benchmarking on director compensation decisions. Director pay relates positively to peer director pay, and firms paying their directors highly are selected as peers. Moreover, firm performance and board advising performance are positively related to the talent component and are generally unrelated to the self-serving component of the peer pay effect. The evidence indicates that firms use peer benchmarking to justify high compensation mainly to attract talented directors to enhance board quality.

The relationship between corruption and acquisition performance is examined in this study, with a focus on stakeholder support. The findings indicate that total acquisition-related gains are reduced when firms with lower corruption pressures acquire targets with higher corruption pressures. Moreover, a negative relationship is highlighted between the corruption differential and the level of support provided by stakeholders. In addition, merger and acquisition deals with higher corruption differences receive lower average support from suppliers, customers, and employees. The evidence suggests that stakeholder commitment is a possible channel through which corruption affects corporate performance. Implementing anticorruption efforts and operating as a multinational corporation are two important factors that may reduce the impact of corruption on acquisition performance.

Firms can effectively stave off outside takeover bids using private investments in public equity (PIPEs) when they face strong takeover pressure. Greater takeover pressure makes PIPE issuers more likely to grant investors large blocks of shares, price discounts, generous dividends, and board seats. Takeover pressure also encourages issuers to place more shares with friendly investors such as managerial investors and strategic alliance investors. The evidence is consistent with the regular methods of the white squire defense. PIPEs can be a preferred method in the choice of a white squire defense when poorly performing and highly overleveraged firms face severe takeover pressure. There is a negative relation between takeover probability and post-issue performance of issuers, which supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis over the shareholder interest hypothesis. Therefore PIPEs can increase, not mitigate, agency problems.