We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation

We investigate the implications of ambiguity aversion for performance and regulation of markets. In our model, agents’ decision making may incorporate both risk and ambiguity, and we demonstrate that nonparticipation arises from the rational decision by some traders to avoid ambiguity. In equilibrium, these participation decisions affect the equilibrium risk premium, and distort market performance when viewed from the perspective of traditional asset pricing models. We demonstrate how regulation, particularly regulation of unlikely events, can moderate the effects of ambiguity, thereby increasing participation and generating welfare gains. Our analysis demonstrates how legal systems affect participation in financial markets through their influence on ambiguity

Financial regulators recognize certain credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes. However, it is often argued that credit rating agencies have an incentive to assign inflated ratings. This paper studies a repeated principal-agent problem in which a regulator approves credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies may collude to assign inflated ratings. Yet we show that there exists an approval scheme which induces credit rating agencies to assign correct ratings

We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy

To control the deer population, state game commissions regulate the types of deer that can be legally harvested. These regulations, however, might have an unintended effect on hunting-related accidents by changing the care hunters take when firing their rifles—a moral hazard effect—or changing the composition of hunters. Using detailed data on hunting accidents and regulations in Pennsylvania counties from 1990 to 2005, we find compelling evidence that harvesting restrictions increase the care hunters take in a manner consistent with moral hazard. Thus, these regulations have a positive safety externality

Changes in regulations governing capital markets always provide a rich setting for archival researchers to examine how such changes affect the behavior of market participants. Barniv et al. (2009; hereafter, BHMT) and Chen and Chen (2009; hereafter CC) examine the impacts of recently enacted regulations aimed at curbing perceived abused by sell-side analysts. There were no less than six significant regulations issued between 2000 and 2003 that affected the activities of analysts. BHMT and CC emphasize different regulations, but both predict that analysts' recommendation will be less biased as a result of the collective regulatory changes. The evidence in both studies is strong and convincing that the association between analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations has changed, consistent with analysts' personal conflicts of interest having less impact on their analyses. However, the attribution of what regulation, if any, effected this change is less clear. Collectively, the similarities and differences in the studies provide a nice setting to understand how different authors approach the same research question

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk

In this study, we examine whether government regulatory initiatives in China involving IPO by SOEs may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors by the issuer. We focus on two sets of IPO regulations issued between January 1, 1996 and February 11, 1999: pricing regulations, which stipulate that IPO prices be a function of accounting performance, and penalty regulations, which penalize IPO firms for overly optimistic forecasts. We find that IPO firms that report better pricing-period accounting performance have larger declines in post-IPO profitability, lower first-day stock returns and worse long-run post-IPO stock performance. Furthermore, IPO firms that make overoptimistic forecasts also have lower first-day returns and worse post-IPO stock performance. Using non-core earnings as the proxy for earnings management, we document some evidence that IPO firms that report higher pricing-period accounting performance have engaged in more income-increasing earnings management. Hence, pricing regulations may have induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-period earnings and affect the post-IPO performance negatively. On the other hand, penalty regulations have deterred IPO firms from making overoptimistic earnings forecast and therefore have a positive impact on the behavior of IPO firms

We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms