Knowledge that Transforms

This paper explores how selective default expectations affect the pricing of sovereign bonds in a historical laboratory: the German default of the 1930s. We analyze yield differentials between identical government bonds traded across various creditor countries before and after bond market segmentation. We show that, when secondary debt markets are segmented, a large selective default probability can be priced in bond yield spreads. Selective default risk accounted for one-third of the yield spread of German external bonds over the risk-free rate during the 1930s. Selective default expectations arose from differences in the creditor countries’ economic power over the debtor.

We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.

This is an Expression of Concern regarding: Amine Ouazad, Matthew E Kahn, Mortgage Finance and Climate Change: Securitization Dynamics in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 35, Issue 8, August 2022, Pages 3617–3665, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab124Following publication of this article, concerns were raised about the reliability of some of the findings reported.1 The journal is investigating these concerns in line with COPE guidance and is publishing this Expression of Concern to inform readers whilst the outcome of the investigation is pending.

We study how Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) affect firms’ engagement with shareholders. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using say-on-pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers ISS to review engagement activities. Firms receiving ISS treatment exhibit swift and substantive increases in extensive and intensive margins of engagement, especially when their boards have higher agency conflicts and directors are more likely to lose voting support from ISS. Increases in engagement persist over time, and shareholders appear to value the increased engagement. Collectively, we shed light on an unexplored channel through which ISS positively influences firms’ governance and information environments.

Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.

A two-sided “credit-line channel”—relating to drawdowns and repayments—explains the severe drop and partial subsequent recovery in bank stock prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Banks with greater exposure to undrawn credit lines saw larger stock price declines but performed better outside of crises periods. Despite deposit inflows, high drawdowns led to reduced bank lending, suggestive of capital encumbrance upon drawdowns. Repayments of credit lines unencumbered capital which explains the stock price recovery starting Q2 2020. Bank provision of credit lines resembles writing put options on aggregate risk, and we propose how to incorporate this feature into bank stress tests.

Retirement savings decisions are increasingly mediated by digital technologies that promise to help individuals plan adequately for their retirement. We exploit a natural experiment to show that introducing a digital pension application increases the probability of making a voluntary retirement contribution by 1.8 percentage points, from an average pretreatment contribution rate of 2.8%. Men and higher-income earners are more likely to respond to the app introduction. We then leverage a field experiment to show that using the app affects contribution behavior mainly through reducing the “hassle” costs of making contributions, rather than by providing information on the associated tax savings.

Modern asset pricing models combine recursive preferences with complex dynamics for the underlying consumption process. The existence of solutions is for many of these models an unsettled question. This paper introduces a novel technique to prove existence and nonexistence, as well as uniqueness for models with recursive preferences. The approach applies to many models of interest, including those with long-run consumption risks, with stochastic volatility and jumps, with time-varying consumption disasters, and with smooth ambiguity aversion and learning. Collectively, the proven results settle the existence question for many of today’s leading asset pricing models.

We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the nature of information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks’ exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Disclosure of banks’ idiosyncratic shortfalls of funds does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resultant reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs.

We develop a dynamic model of costly stock short-selling and lending market and obtain implications that simultaneously support many empirical regularities related to short-selling. In our model, investors’ belief disagreement leads to shorting demand, whereby short-sellers pay shorting fees to borrow stocks from lenders. Our main novel results are as follows. Short interest is positively related to shorting fee and predicts stock returns negatively. Higher short-selling risk can be associated with lower stock returns and less short-selling activity. Stock volatility is increased under costly short-selling. An application to GameStop episode yields implications consistent with observed patterns.