Knowledge that Transforms

Mimicking portfolios have long been useful in asset pricing research. In most empirical applications, the portfolio weights are assumed to be fixed over time, while in theory they may be functions of the economic state. This paper derives and characterizes mimicking portfolios in the presence of predetermined state variables, or conditioning information. The results generalize and integrate multifactor minimum variance efficiency (Fama (1996)) with conditional and unconditional mean-variance efficiency (Hansen and Richard (1987), Ferson and Siegel (2001)). Empirical examples illustrate the potential importance of time-varying mimicking portfolio weights and highlight challenges in their application.

Does a financial system architecture anchored on banks perform better than one centered on markets in fostering technological innovations as engines of growth? In a panel of industrial sectors across a large cross section of countries, I find that while market-based systems have a general positive effect on innovations in all economic sectors, bank-based systems foster more rapid technological progress in more information-intensive industrial sectors, suggesting a heterogeneous impact of financial architecture. Thus, the relative performance of bank-based systems vis-à-vis market-based systems depends on the industrial structure of the economy.

The Russian bond default in August 1998 and the long-term capital management (LTCM) recapitalization announcement in the following month represent an unusual period of volatility in international bond markets with bond spreads increasing dramatically across the globe. Using a latent factor model and a new data set spanning bond markets across Asia, Europe and the Americas, we quantify the contribution of contagion to the spread of these two crises. The maximum amount of contagion experienced by any of the countries investigated is about 17% of total volatility in bond spreads, with the main effects due to the Russian crisis. The results also show that both emerging and developed markets experienced contagion during the period.

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.

When bankers observe a rival winning in the interbank competition for lending to a firm, they infer that the firm may be more promising than they had thought. From this consideration, they loosen their creditworthiness tests and lower the interest rates they offer in the next lending competition for the firm. Increased interbank competition reduces the impact of this observational learning and decreases the credit risk taken by each bank because of a severe winner's curse, while it increases the aggregate risk taken by the entire banking sector.

If investors are myopic mean-variance optimizers, a stock's expected return is linearly related to its beta in the cross-section. The slope of the relation is the cross-sectional price of risk, which should equal the expected equity premium. We use this simple observation to forecast the equity-premium time series with the cross-sectional price of risk. We also introduce novel statistical methods for testing stock-return predictability based on endogenous variables whose shocks are potentially correlated with return shocks. Our empirical tests show that the cross-sectional price of risk (1) is strongly correlated with the market's yield measures and (2) predicts equity-premium realizations, especially in the first half of our 1927–2002 sample.

We document that gold mining firms have consistently realized economically significant cash flow gains from their derivatives transactions. We conclude that these cash flows have increased shareholder value since there is no evidence of an offsetting adjustment in firms’ systematic risk. This finding contradicts a central assumption in the risk management literature that derivatives transactions have zero net present value, and highlights an important motive for firms to use derivatives that the literature has hitherto ignored. Although we find considerable evidence of selective hedging in our sample, the cash flow gains from selective hedging appear to be small at best.

While it is crucial to understand the impact of regulatory changes on market risk, the literature does not show how risk responds to expected regulatory changes that are specifically designed to change risk. Our paper fills this gap by providing a detailed study of one such case. Using both a sample of privatized U.K. companies, and U.K. and U.S. control portfolios, between 1993 and 2000, we show (both for the single-factor market model and the three-factor Fama-French model) that the observed changes in market risk are significant and consistent with theory.

Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Our results hold even when we correct for the availability of financing, the degree of protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations.

We develop a multi-period learning model to examine the relation between analysts’ forecasting behavior and their performance. In a competitive market for banking services, the surplus and the analyst's payoff, which is determined through bargaining, are convex in her reputation. The convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a U-shaped relation between the analyst's forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience. We find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis. Significant underperformers (outperformers) face higher (lower) employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts.