We investigate an asset pricing model with preferences cycling between high risk aversion and low EIS in fall/winter and the reverse in spring/summer. Calibrating to consumption data and allowing plausible preference parameter values, we produce returns that match observed equity and Treasury returns across the seasons: risky returns are higher and risk-free returns are lower or stable in fall/winter, and they reverse in spring/summer. Further, risky returns vary more than risk-free returns. A novel finding is that both EIS and risk aversion must vary seasonally to match observed returns. Further, the degree of necessary seasonal change in EIS is small.

We use party-identifying language—like “liberal media” and “MAGA”—to identify Republican users on the investor social platform StockTwits. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that partisan Republicans remain relatively unfazed in their beliefs about equities during the COVID-19 pandemic, while other users become considerably more pessimistic. In cross-sectional tests, we find Republicans become relatively more optimistic about stocks that suffered the most during the COVID-19 crisis, but more pessimistic about Chinese stocks. Finally, stocks with the greatest partisan disagreement on StockTwits have significantly more trading in the broader market, explaining 28% of the increase in stock turnover during the pandemic.

Donald Trump’s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations about U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden’s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms’ stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a “boomerang” in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump’s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival.

Using a novel typology of serial acquirers, we examine several puzzles documented in the prior literature. We show that acquisitions by different types of acquirers are driven by different factors, they acquire different sizes of targets, and subsequent acquisitions by acquirers are predictable ex ante. Controlling for market anticipation, the most frequent serial acquirers do not earn declining returns as they continue acquiring, while less frequent acquirers do. Our methodology enhances our understanding of serial acquisition dynamics, anticipation, and economic value adjustments. The methodology is likely to be relevant to topics related to event anticipation beyond those covered in this study.

Despite the size and importance of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and collective investment trusts, their characteristics and performance have not been studied in detail. We show that separate account performance is similar to that of index funds and superior to that of actively managed mutual funds. Management supplies a benchmark for each separate account. When the management-selected benchmark is used to measure performance, performance is significantly overstated. Despite this, investors react to differences in performance from the management-preferred benchmark in choosing among SMAs. Finally we find variables that explain both the cross section of alphas and the cross section of cash flows.

In this paper, the authors use monthly holdings to study timing ability. These data differ from holdings data used in previous studies in that the authors’ data have a higher frequency and include a full range of securities, not just traded equities. Using a one-index model, the authors find, as do two recent studies, that management appears to have positive and statistically significant timing ability. When a multiindex model is used, the authors show that timing decisions do not result in an increase in performance, whether timing is measured using conditional or unconditional sensitivities. The authors show that sector rotation decisions with respect to high-tech stocks are a major contribution to negative timing.

Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Christopher R. Blake; Common Factors in Active and Passive Portfolios, European Finance Review, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1 Janu

This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the Yankee bond market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, G1.

Projects with negative expected value cannot obtain financing in competitive capital markets if all potential investors are risk neutral and have identical beliefs about the distribution of the project′s net revenue. We present a series of examples with heterogeneous beliefs in which it is possible for a project to obtain financing even though all investors in the project believe, conditional on the project being undertaken, that the project has negative expected value. An important feature of the examples is that the differences in beliefs are due only to differences in information, and are not simply arbitrary unexplained differences in opinions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:D8, G1.

No previous infectious disease outbreak, including the Spanish Flu, has affected the stock market as forcefully as the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, previous pandemics left only mild traces on the U.S. stock market. We use text-based methods to develop these points with respect to large daily stock market moves back to 1900 and with respect to overall stock market volatility back to 1985. We also evaluate potential explanations for the unprecedented stock market reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic. The evidence we amass suggests that government restrictions on commercial activity and voluntary social distancing, operating with powerful effects in a service-oriented economy, are the main reasons the U.S. stock market reacted so much more forcefully to COVID-19 than to previous pandemics in 1918–1919, 1957–1958, and 1968.