Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.

We provide large-scale evidence on the occurrence and value of FinTech innovation. Using data on patent filings from 2003 to 2017, we apply machine learning to identify and classify innovations by their underlying technologies. We find that most FinTech innovations yield substantial value to innovators, with blockchain being particularly valuable. For the overall financial sector, internet of things (IoT), robo-advising, and blockchain are the most valuable innovation types. Innovations affect financial industries more negatively when they involve disruptive technologies from nonfinancial startups, but market leaders that invest heavily in their own innovation can avoid much of the negative value effect.ReceivedMay 31, 2017; editorial decision September 30, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

This paper studies managers’ use of accounting discretion to deter entry. Using state-level changes in branching regulation under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, I find geographically-constrained community banks increased their loan loss provisions to appear less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Additional tests rule out alternative explanations that firm economics or regulators drove the increase. I complement my analyses with survey-based evidence. Findings from the survey confirm that banks prefer to locate in markets where incumbents have high profitability and low credit losses, and that banks use competitors’ financial statements to analyze competition.

We examine the relation between firms' voluntary guidance and mandatory 8K filings. We find a negative relation between guidance and 8Ks, which strengthens following the 2004 expansion of mandatory 8K requirements, consistent with firms using the disclosures as substitutes. Increases in 8Ks coincide with declines in firms’ profits, but this negative relation weakens after the 2004 regulation, consistent with firms broadening the scope of information conveyed through 8Ks. Together, our findings suggest firms became more reliant on 8Ks to convey general types of information after the 2004 regulation, rather than primarily negative news, which reduces their incentives to issue guidance.

We find that forecast revisions by analysts with more favorable surnames elicit stronger market reactions. The effect is stronger among firms with lower institutional ownership and for analysts with non-American first names. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and France and Germany's opposition to the Iraq War, revisions by analysts with Middle Eastern and French or German surnames, respectively, generated weaker market reaction. Surname favorability is not associated with forecast quality, but it has complementary effects with forecast performance on analysts’ career outcomes. Surname favorability mitigates under-reaction to forecast revisions. These findings are distinct from the effects of ethnic, cultural proximity, or in-group bias.

We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully, with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings. We generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings‐returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated. This parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results: reported losses are less persistent than reported gains, decision making diminishes the S‐shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by Basu [1997]. Furthermore, the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single‐peaked. Instead, it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]. However, within our model, none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise, bias, or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior. They are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based.

We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors’ use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information.

A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the importance of cooperation affects the use of information about peer performance in target setting, also known as relative target setting. Specifically, we use data from an industrial services company where business unit managers need to share specialized equipment and staff with their peers to manage bottlenecks in their capacity. We construct several empirical proxies for the costs and benefits of information about peer performance and examine their effects on target setting. We find robust evidence that the sensitivity of target revisions to past peer performance is higher when peer group performance has greater capacity to filter out noise but lower when the importance of cooperation among peers is greater.

This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating agencies and how these incentives are affected by the level of competition in the rating industry and by rating agencies' role as gatekeepers to debt markets. We develop a model featuring an entrepreneur who seeks project financing from a perfectly competitive debt market. After publicly disclosing a financial report, the entrepreneur can purchase credit ratings from rating agencies that strategically choose their rating fees and rating inflation. We derive the following core results: (1) More rating industry competition leads to stronger corporate misreporting incentives if ratings are sufficiently precise or if rating agencies assume a gatekeeper role. Under imperfect rating industry competition, (2) agencies' gatekeeper role primarily weakens firms' misreporting incentives, which then influences rating agencies' strategies, and (3) firms' misreporting and rating agencies' rating inflation can be strategic complements when agencies assume a gatekeeper role. (4) Regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing rating industry competition or at weakening rating agencies' gatekeeper role improve investment efficiency as long as corporate misreporting incentives are not significantly strengthened.

We examine whether financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records pose a greater risk to investors than those without. We find that financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records are more likely to receive future customer complaints. Their complaints are more likely to receive arbitration awards or settlements and are more likely to involve large settlements exceeding $100,000. Finally, clients are more likely to suffer service disruptions from engaging advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records, even incremental to the brokerage firm being high‐risk. Although we do not have performance data of individual advisors, mutual funds of those firms that employ advisors with criminal records do not provide their clients with superior returns nor charge lower fees, suggesting that there are not compensating benefits to offset the investor harm. Overall, pre‐advisor criminal record serves as an important ex ante characteristic available to regulators, investors, and employers for risk‐assessment purposes.