Knowledge that Transforms

Two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the disability insurance program are to what extent it discourages work, and how valuable the insurance is to individuals and families. These questions motivate our paper. We begin by describing the earnings, disposable income, and consumption of awarded and rejected DI applicants, before and after the disability onset and the allowance decision. Next, we discuss how these descriptive results can be interpreted through the lens of alternative empirical approaches. Our analysis uses a Norwegian population panel data set with detailed information about every individual and household.

Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics capturing economic and psychological parameters, which we estimate using a novel within-subject information disclosure experiment. The main results suggest that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient lightbulbs may increase welfare, but informational and attentional biases alone do not justify a ban on incandescent lightbulbs. Our results and techniques generate broader methodological insights into welfare analysis with misoptimizing consumers.

Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market experiment show a marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Mixed markets show intermediate values, and a meta-analysis of 35 markets from different studies confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market. Women's price forecasts also are significantly lower, even in the first period. Implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed.

We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes, and average prices paid by consumers (“effective” prices) using data on prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across many US metropolitan areas. Inflation in the effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment while little change occurs in the inflation rate of prices posted by retailers. This difference reflects the reallocation of household expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify, rather than sales. We propose a simple model with household store-switching and assess its implications for business cycles and policymakers.

The Great Migration-the massive migration of African Americans out of the rural South to largely urban locations in the North, Midwest, and West-was a landmark event in U.S. HISTORY: Our paper shows that this migration increased mortality of African Americans born in the early twentieth century South. This inference comes from an analysis that uses proximity of birthplace to railroad lines as an instrument for migration.

IRBs can disallow high incentives they deem coercive. A vignette study on MTurk concerning participation in medical trials shows that a substantial minority of subjects concurs. They think high incentives cause more regret, and that more people would be better off without the opportunity to participate. We model observers as judging the ethicality of incentives by partially using their own utility. The model predicts that payments are repugnant only to the extent that they affect the participation decision, and more so for larger transactions. Incentivizing poorer participants is more repugnant, and in-kind incentives are less repugnant than monetary incentives.

We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.

Researchers typically invoke theoretical assumptions to estimate mark-ups. Instead, we directly obtain mark-ups by surveying Pakistani soccer-ball producers. We document six facts: (i) Mark-ups are more dispersed than costs; (ii) Mark-ups and costs increase with firm size; (iii) The mark-up elasticity with respect to size exceeds the cost elasticity; (iv) Costs increase with size because larger firms use higher-quality inputs; (v) Larger firms charge higher mark-ups because they have higher production shares of high-quality balls that carry higher mark-ups, and because they charge higher mark-ups conditional on ball type; (vi) Correlations suggest marketing efforts are important for generating higher mark-ups.

This article develops a theory in which a firm's adoption of a prosocial purpose can increase profitability by strengthening employees' reputation and identity—leading to higher effort and lower wages—as long as implementing purpose is costly with respect to direct monetary payoffs. Employees who value prosocial action will select into firms with a social purpose, which then become a visible carrier for these employees' identity and reputation.

Faced with numerous potential catastrophes—nuclear and bioterrorism, mega-viruses, climate change, and others—which should society attempt to avert? A policy to avert one catastrophe considered in isolation might be evaluated in cost-benefit terms. But because society faces multiple catastrophes, simple cost-benefit analysis fails: even if the benefit of averting each one exceeds the cost, we should not necessarily avert them all. We explore the policy interdependence of catastrophic events, and develop a rule for determining which catastrophes should be averted and which should not.