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Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications

American Economic Review 2015 105(1), 67-99 open access
Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master's programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We show that existing matching mechanisms suffer from inefficiency and instability, and propose a mechanism that is better in terms of efficiency, stability, and incentives while respecting the distributional constraints. (JEL C70, D61, D63)

Individual Time Preferences and Energy Efficiency

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 196-200 open access
We examine the role of individual discount rates in energy efficiency decisions using evidence from an extensive survey of US homeowners to elicit preferences for energy efficiency and cash flows over time. We find considerable heterogeneity in individual discount rates. We also find that individual time preferences systematically influence willingness to invest in energy efficiency, as measured through product choices, required payback periods, and energy efficiency tax credit claims. Education is a key driver of individual discount rates. Our findings highlight the importance of individual discount rates to understanding energy efficiency investments, the energy-efficiency gap, and policy evaluation.

The Real Effects of Relational Contracts

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 452-456 open access
Does the “soft side” of management matter? Many managers assert that “firm culture” is strongly correlated with productivity, but there are few robust tests of this assertion. In a set of field experiments, we study driver productivity within a large US logistics company that is arguably transitioning from one relational contract to another, while leaving formal practices and incentives unchanged. We find that sites under the new contract are associated with 1/8 percent higher productivity. Our findings suggest that relational contracts have a first-order effect on productivity and that they can be altered over time.

Prediction Policy Problems

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 491-495 open access
Most empirical policy work focuses on causal inference. We argue an important class of policy problems does not require causal inference but instead requires predictive inference. Solving these “prediction policy problems” requires more than simple regression techniques, since these are tuned to generating unbiased estimates of coefficients rather than minimizing prediction error. We argue that new developments in the field of “machine learning” are particularly useful for addressing these prediction problems. We use an example from health policy to illustrate the large potential social welfare gains from improved prediction.

Income Inequality, Capitalism, and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 593-597 open access
We examine the relationship between capitalism and income inequality for a large sample of countries using an adjusted economic freedom index as proxy for capitalism. Our results suggest that there is no robust relationship between economic freedom and Gini coefficients based on gross income. Subsequently, we analyze the relationship between income redistribution and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. We find that the impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on income redistribution is conditional on the level of economic freedom: countries that have a high degree of fractionalization redistribute income less, while capitalist countries that have a low degree of fractionalization redistribute income more.

Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock

American Economic Review 2015 105(1), 234-271 open access
Following FCC pressure to end bill shock, cellular carriers now alert customers when they exceed usage allowances. We estimate a model of plan choice, usage, and learning using a 2002–2004 panel of cellular bills. Accounting for firm price adjustment, we predict that implementing alerts in 2002–2004 would have lowered average annual consumer welfare by $33. We show that consumers are inattentive to past usage, meaning that bill-shock alerts are informative. Additionally, our estimates imply that consumers are overconfident, underestimating the variance of future calling. Overconfidence costs consumers $76 annually at 2002–2004 prices. Absent overconfidence, alerts would have little to no effect. (JEL D12, D18, L11, L96, L98)

Competition, Markups, and the Gains from International Trade

American Economic Review 2015 105(10), 3183-3221 open access
We study the procompetitive gains from international trade in a quantitative model with endogenously variable markups. We find that trade can significantly reduce markup distortions if two conditions are satisfied: (i) there is extensive misallocation, and (ii) opening to trade exposes hitherto dominant producers to greater competitive pressure. We measure the extent to which these two conditions are satisfied in Taiwanese producer-level data. Versions of our model consistent with the Taiwanese data predict that opening up to trade strongly increases competition and reduces markup distortions by up to one-half, thus significantly reducing productivity losses due to misallocation. (JEL D43, F12, F14, L13, L60, O47)

Geography, Depreciation, and Growth

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 252-256 open access
It has been proposed that geography influences economic growth for many reasons. Previous analyses of comparative development seem to have sidestepped the question of location-dependent depreciation. However the construction of new measures of tropical cyclone exposure enables us to consider the potential impact of this single source of capital depreciation. Using an estimate of asset destruction due to tropical cyclones, we identify the “sandcastle depreciation” rate, and find support for location-dependent depreciation by looking at average growth rates. This leads us to propose that heterogeneous and geographically-dependent depreciation rates may play an important role in global patterns of economic development.

Can Alcohol Prohibition Reduce Violence Against Women?

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 625-629 open access
Violence against women is a critical problem across the world. In this paper, we exploit state and temporal variation in alcohol control in India to examine the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption and violent crimes against women. We first use detailed household survey data to show that prohibition policies are associated with substantially lower rates of drinking among men and domestic violence. Next, we provide evidence that alcohol prohibition reduces aggregate violence against women in officially reported crime data. The results suggest that policies that restrict access to alcohol may help reduce gender violence.

Inequality, Leverage, and Crises

American Economic Review 2015 105(3), 1217-1245 open access
The paper studies how high household leverage and crises can be caused by changes in the income distribution. Empirically, the periods 1920–1929 and 1983–2008 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of high-income households, a large increase in debt leverage of low- and middle-income households, and an eventual financial and real crisis. The paper presents a theoretical model where higher leverage and crises are the endogenous result of a growing income share of high-income households. The model matches the profiles of the income distribution, the debt-to-income ratio and crisis risk for the three decades preceding the Great Recession. (JEL D14, D31, D33, E32, E44, G01, N22)