A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross‐sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers.
We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950–96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by‐product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns.
As a consequence of optimal investment choices, a firm's assets and growth options change in predictable ways. Using a dynamic model, we show that this imparts predictability to changes in a firm's systematic risk, and its expected return. Simulations show that the model simultaneously reproduces: (i) the time‐series relation between the book‐to‐market ratio and asset returns; (ii) the cross‐sectional relation between book‐to‐market, market value, and return; (iii) contrarian effects at short horizons; (iv) momentum effects at longer horizons; and (v) the inverse relation between interest rates and the market risk premium.
This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.
One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less‐developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially “unconstrained” buyers acquire “constrained” targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing. We also find that bidders generally retain target management, suggesting that management may have provided company‐specific operational information, while the bidder provided capital‐budgeting expertise.
For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.
ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES in finance is what the factors are that affect expected return on assets, the sensitivity of expected return to those factors, and the reward for bearing this sensitivity.There is a long history of testing in this area, and it is clearly one of the most investigated areas in finance.Almost all of the testing I am aware of involves using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns.The use of average realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that information surprises tend to cancel out over the period of a study and realized returns are therefore an unbiased estimate of expected returns.However, I believe that there is ample evidence that this belief is misplaced.There are periods longer than 10 years during which stock market realized returns are on average less than the risk-free rate ~1973 to 1984!.There are periods longer than 50 years in which risky long-term bonds on average underperform the risk free rate ~1927 to 1981!. 1 Having a risky asset with an expected return above the riskless rate is an extremely weak condition for realized returns to be an appropriate proxy for expected returns, and 11 and 50 years is an awfully long time for such a weak condition not to be satisfied.In the recent past, the United States has had stock market returns of higher than 30 percent per year while Asian markets have had negative returns.Does anyone honestly believe that this is because this was the riskiest period in history for the United States and the safest for Asia?Furthermore, there is a large body of evidence we find anomalous.This includes the effect of inf lation on asset pricing and the failure of the generalized expectation theory to explain term premiums.Changing risk premiums and conditional asset pricing theories may be a way of "explaining" some of the anomalous results; however, this does not explain returns on risky assets that are less than the riskless rate for the long periods when it has occurred.It seems to me that the more logical explanation for these anomalous results is that realized returns are a very poor measure of expected returns and that information surprises highly inf luence a number of factors in our
The arrival of public information in the U.S. Treasury market sets off a two‐stage adjustment process for prices, trading volume, and bid‐ask spreads. In a brief first stage, the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume, demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading. The spread widens dramatically at announcement, evidently driven by inventory control concerns. In a prolonged second stage, trading volume surges, price volatility persists, and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views.
Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.
Previous studies identify predetermined variables that predict stock and bond returns through time. This paper shows that loadings on the same variables provide significant cross‐sectional explanatory power for stock portfolio returns. The loadings are significant given the three factors advocated by Fama and French (1993) and the four factors of Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995). The explanatory power of the loadings on lagged variables is robust to various portfolio grouping procedures and other considerations. The results carry implications for risk analysis, performance measurement, cost‐of‐capital calculations, and other applications.