Knowledge that Transforms

We find that CEO compensation increases following acquisitions only in those deals in which acquirer stock is used as the method of payment. These compensation increases are driven by increases in equity-based compensation and are concentrated in riskier acquirers, in riskier acquisitions, and in acquirers whose CEOs have low exposure to the stock price. We find little support for traditional agency cost explanations of changes in CEO pay following acquisitions. However, our findings are broadly consistent with compensation changes representing a contracting solution to a two-sided adverse selection problem that is present only in stock acquisitions.

How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

Exploiting changes in countries’ competition laws, we find that competition increases firms’ propensity to use zero leverage (ZL). We test the financial-flexibility, financial-constraint, and quiet-life explanations for this result, concluding that desire for flexibility is the one most likely. The relation between competition and ZL strengthens with cash-flow volatility, which supports the flexibility motive. Adoption of ZL by firms is accompanied by increases in payouts, so it is unlikely that ZL adopters are constrained. Proxies for governance have no effect on the relation between competition and ZL, suggesting that desire for a quiet life is not the explanation either.

We study the information content of corporate insiders’ trades after earnings announcements. We find little evidence that insiders trade on foreknowledge of material information in the post-SOX period. Conditioning on short-selling activity as a proxy for demand of arbitrageurs who exploit short-term mispricing, we show that insiders profit from selling because of their ability to exploit short-term mispricing after earnings releases. In contrast before SOX, insiders do take advantage of foreknowledge of material information while selling. Insider purchases are based on foreknowledge of material information both before and after SOX, but they are rare and have small economic magnitude.

This article studies the importance of corporate boards through a learning model in which capital markets learn about incoming directors’ quality. The model’s predictions are tested across a large sample of director appointments. Estimates show that governance-related uncertainty accounts for about 10% of stock return volatility when a new director joins. The learning framework provides a theoretically grounded approach to identify when directors matter more to investors. The analysis shows that director importance varies with board composition and firm attributes: Investors perceive directors as more important on boards with greater generational diversity, in smaller firms, and firms with higher knowledge capital.

This study examines how changes in political leadership and rising U.S. polarization flow through societal culture to corporate culture. Using quasi-experimental methods, we find that executives adjust culture messaging in earnings calls on extensive and intensive margins across varying political contexts. These changes follow two pathways: under political alignment, executives emphasize their firm’s culture, motivated by pride; and under political misalignment, executives reduce cultural messaging—particularly innovation, quality, and respect—due to lower perceived growth opportunities. Additional tests reveal these changes reflect strategic communication rather than fundamental cultural changes. Our findings highlight how cultural messaging varies with political context.

This study provides direct evidence of the association between debt–equity conflict and investment efficiency in financially distressed firms. Leveraging a unique institutional setting in Japan, we examine the impact of lender-affiliated directors on the managerial decisions of their borrowers. Although banker-directors do not influence firms at low risks of default, their presence leads to more conservative financial decisions in distressed firms, thereby mitigating shareholder exploitation. They also reduce information frictions to prevent overinvestment and underinvestment. However, despite within-firm efficiency gains, potential spillover effects on other stakeholders raise questions about the broader welfare implications of this debt–equity conflict mitigation.

Stocks that are expensive to borrow underperform significantly and for long periods of time. Every share must be held by an investor who does not lend it out and, hence, loses money. I find no evidence that investors hold these stocks in anticipation of lending them in the future. Instead, investors appear to hold these stocks for short-term trading. When turnover is high, high-fee stocks are overpriced and underperform. When turnover is low, high-fee stock prices are low, and they earn positive returns. More Robinhood investors hold shares when turnover is high than when it is low.

We show that banks use industry knowledge acquired through corporate lending in mortgage lending, a phenomenon we refer to as the “industry expertise channel.” Specifically, banks that specialize in particular industries expand their mortgage lending activity in regions where those industries are concentrated. The impact of industry expertise increases with information asymmetry and borrower risk. In addition, mortgages originated from this channel contain more soft information and perform better. The effect of the channel increases after unexpected industry distress and the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that the effect is likely causal.

Using model-free skewness measures that exploit the asymmetry in semivariances and option data from the over-the-counter currency market, we find that buying currencies with a high skewness risk premium (SRP) and selling currencies with a low SRP generates high returns and a Sharpe ratio. Asset pricing tests—which control for omitted variables and measurement errors—show that a SRP factor enters the currency pricing kernel and is central to the pricing of risks inherent in a broad currency cross section of 60 portfolio excess returns. These results imply that skewness risk is a strong and priced source of currency risk.