Knowledge that Transforms

This paper estimates the pass-through of minimum wage increases into the prices of U.S. grocery and drug stores. We use high-frequency scanner data and leverage a large number of state-level increases in minimum wages between 2001 and 2012. We find that a 10% minimum wage hike translates into a 0.36% increase in the prices of grocery products. This magnitude is consistent with a full pass-through of cost increases into consumer prices. We show that price adjustments occur mostly in the three months following the passage of minimum wage legislation rather than after implementation, suggesting that pricing of groceries is forward-looking.

We study the impact of money on households during the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, Colombia rolled out a new unconditional cash transfer (UCT) to 1 million households in poverty worth US$19 (PPP US$55.6) and paid every five to eight weeks. Using a randomized control trial and linked administrative and survey data, we find the UCT had positive (albeit modest) effects on measures of household well-being (e.g., financial health, food access). Moreover, the UCT boosted support for emergency assistance to households and firms during the crisis and promoted social cooperation. Finally, we explore the bottlenecks in expanding mobile money during a pandemic.

Exogenous shifts in international food commodity prices, which are identified using an SVAR model with global harvest shocks as an external instrument, explain almost 30% of euro-area inflation volatility over the medium term and contributed significantly to the twin puzzle of missing (dis)inflation in the era after the Great Recession. International food price shocks have an impact on food retail prices through the food production chain, but also trigger indirect inflationary effects via a depreciation of the euro and, most important, rising wages. Finally, due to asymmetric wage responses, the inflationary effects are very different across member states.

We use a survey experiment to generate direct evidence on how people acquire and process information. Participants can buy different information signals that could help them forecast future national home prices. We elicit their valuations and exogenously vary the cost of information. Participants put substantial value on their preferred signal and, when acquired, incorporate the signal in their beliefs. However, they disagree on which signal to buy. As a result, making information cheaper does not decrease the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations. We provide a model with costly acquisition and processing of information, which can match most of our empirical results.

We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market fundamentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources, we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.

This analysis extends the work of William Baumol and David Bradford, on efficient pricing with a multiproduct monopoly, to include the case of intermodal competition. A set of rules is developed, showing how second best processes deviate from marginal cost when economics of scale are present. The paper shows why these rules may be difficult to implement in some cases, with a direct application to surface freight transport and then suggests a variation in the theory of second best that may be useful given those difficulties.

We study the New York City taxi market to examine whether an excise tax hike on cigarettes corresponds to smoker taxi drivers more frequently cheating their customers. Increased cheating could be motivated by both financial pressures and as a reaction to unfair treatment (as surveyed smokers view cigarette tax hikes as quite unfair). We examine this question using detailed ride-level data where we can identify a rare but fraudulent overcharging technique (cheating) and a subsample of taxi drivers who smoke (affected taxpayers, identified via tickets for smoking in a cab). In difference-in-differences regressions we find that following a cigarette tax hike, taxi drivers who smoke are approximately 1.5 times more likely to cheat customers than other drivers. Our findings are strongest in the subsample of smokers with consistently low earnings.