Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation‐intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

Abstract Deferred compensation is often proposed as an instrument to prevent managerial myopia. However, empirical studies show that its practical use is limited when it comes to managerial retirement. We study the optimal design of accounting‐based deferred compensation for retiring managers. While deferred compensation is useful in establishing long‐term incentives, it causes contracting frictions in subsequent periods. Deferred bonuses of retiring managers imply inefficiently weak incentives for incoming managers. This down‐scaling effect renders deferred compensation less useful in providing long‐term incentives. We also find that the down‐scaling effect has implications for the desirability of accounting timeliness—that is, the timely recognition of future cash flows in current accounting earnings—from a stewardship perspective. If managers' long‐term actions are sufficiently important, higher timeliness can cause more myopic managerial incentives.

Abstract This study finds that accounting standards play an important role in cross‐border investor reactions to peer firm earnings. Specifically, we document that when international peer firms report under the same accounting standards, investors overreact to peer firms' earnings announcements. Using a sample of 35,116 firm‐pair‐years from 51 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that heightened information transfers for international same‐standard firms are followed by predictable price reversals when investors observe own‐firm earnings. However, overreactions are not present for international firm‐pairs that follow different accounting standards. While we find that institutional investors learn over time, overreactions do not decline among retail investors. Additional tests suggest that overreactions cause significant excess volatility, which results in economically significant costs. Collectively, our findings document an unintended consequence of financial reporting harmonization in the form of increased investor overreactions.

Common values auction models, where bidder decisions depend on noisy signals of common values, provide predictions about Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes. In settings where these common values can be estimated, these predictions can be tested. We propose a series of tests, robust to assumptions about the signal structure, to determine whether the observed data could have been generated by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the setting of oil and gas lease auctions in New Mexico, we find evidence that participation decisions are correlated and that participants systematically underbid in light of ex post outcomes. (JEL D44, D82, L12, L71, Q35)

We show that administrative hourly wage data exhibit considerable bunching at round numbers. We run two experiments randomizing wages around $0.10 and $1.00 to experimentally measure left-digit bias for identical tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk; we fail to find any evidence of discontinuity in the labor supply function at round numbers despite estimating a considerable degree of monopsony. We replicate these results in administrative worker-firm hourly wage data from Oregon. We can rule out inattention estimates found in the behavioral product market literature. We provide evidence that firms “misoptimize” wage setting. More monopsony requires less employer misoptimization to explain bunching. (JEL D22, J22, J31, J42)

We present five facts from an experiment on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory transfers: (1) the one-month MPC on a cash-like transfer is 23 percent; (2) it is substantially higher (61 percent) on a transfer administered via a card where remaining funds expire after three weeks, inconsistent with money fungibility; (3) the consumption response is concentrated in the first three weeks; (4) MPCs vary with household characteristics but are high even for the liquid wealthy; (5) unconditional MPC distribution exhibits large variation. Our findings inform the design of stimulus policies and pose challenges to existing macroeconomic models. (JEL D12, D91, E21, G51, I38)

We provide a model connecting the global saving glut to productivity growth. The key feature is that the tradable sector is the engine of growth of the economy. Capital flows from developing countries to the United States boost demand for US nontradable goods, inducing a reallocation of US economic activity from the tradable sector to the nontradable one. In turn, lower profits in the tradable sector lead firms to cut back investment in innovation. Since innovation in the United States determines the evolution of the world technological frontier, the result is a drop in global productivity growth. (JEL E21, E22, E23, E44, F32, F43, O31)

We conducted a randomized trial among 14,545 households in rural Burkina Faso to test the oft-cited hypothesis that limited access to contraception is an important driver of high fertility rates in West Africa. We do not find support for this hypothesis. Women who were given free access to modern contraception for three years did not have lower birth rates; we can reject even modest effects. We cross-randomized additional interventions to address inefficiencies that might depress demand for free contraception, specifically misperceptions about the child mortality rate and social norms. Free contraception did not significantly influence fertility even in combination with these interventions. (JEL D12, J13, J16, J18, O12)

We measure how cuts to public procurement propagate through the banking system in a financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese government cut procurement spending by 4.3 percent of GDP. We find that this cut saddled banks with nonperforming loans from government contractors, which led to a persistent reduction in credit supply to other firms. We estimate a bank-level elasticity of credit supply with respect to procurement demand of 2.5. In a general equilibrium model, our findings point to large effects of fiscal policy on credit supply and output in a crisis. (JEL E23, E44, E62, G01, G21, H57)

Coasts contain a disproportionate share of the world's population, reflecting historical advantages, but environmental change threatens a reversal of coastal fortune in the coming decades as natural disasters intensify and sea levels rise. This paper considers whether large infrastructure investments should continue to favor coastal areas. I estimate a dynamic spatial equilibrium framework using detailed geo-referenced data on road investments in Vietnam from 2000 to 2010 and find evidence that coastal favoritism has significant costs. The results highlight the importance of accounting for the dynamic effects of environmental change in deciding where to allocate infrastructure today. (JEL H54, O18, P25, Q54, R11, R42, R58)